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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the support of Congressman
Charles Wilson, D-TX, for the Nicaraguan government of Anastasio Somoza
Debayle from March 1977 to July 1979. A narrative of Wilson's actions and
motivations it relies heavily on his congressional papers for primary sources. This
work argues that Wilson was motivated by his personal anti-Communist beliefs to
challenge the perceived biased application of the Carter Administration's human
rights policy against the Somoza regime. He saw the administration's
abandonment of Nicaragua, a traditional Cold War ally after four decades of loyal
support, as directly contributing to the rise of a Communist regime following
Somoza’s fall. It also explores the role of Congress in influencing American
foreign policy. Furthermore, it proves that Wilson was a committed antiCommunist with an interest in foreign policy before his adventures in the
mountains of Afghanistan during the 1980s for which he has become famous
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Introduction
The election of Democrat Jimmy Carter as President in 1977 created political and
ideological concerns for hawkish members of his own party who felt that the president’s
policies put them at risk. The party's shift towards the progressive left, reflected in the
introduction of human rights into American foreign policy and the State Department's
attempts to distance the United States from regimes deemed to have violated human
rights, deepened divisions between moderate and conservative Democrats. For Texas
Congressman Charles “Charlie” Wilson, Carter's shift away from what had long been an
established U.S. foreign policy of opposing Communism at every turn represented a
danger to national security and reeked of appeasement. He also saw the administration’s
weak stance on Communist aggression as a potential liability for his and other Southern
Democrats’ political futures, because it could leave them exposed to a challenge from a
more conservative Democrat, especially in conservative districts like East Texas.1 It was
a desire to push back against the Carter administration's foreign policy and prevent an
American ally from falling to a Communist insurgency that led Wilson to support
continued U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan government of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, despite
the regime being labeled a violator of human rights by the administration.

1

Robert A. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua, Revised and Updated
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Westview Press, 2002), 45, 314 note 11.
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Wilson's actions were driven by his own anti-Communist beliefs and his
realpolitik view of foreign policy. He was looking for a way to challenge the Carter
Administration's human rights policy which he viewed as biased against conservative
regimes and dangerous to America's interests; Nicaragua simply became the place this
fight took place.2 Somoza, however, was motivated by his family’s personal history
which viewed continued American support as vital to the regime's survival. Throughout
the Somoza dynasty's four decades in power it cultivated and maintained a powerful
network of lobbyists in the United States to preserve Nicaragua's relationship with
Washington. It was through this network, which Somoza inherited, that Wilson was
recruited to campaign in Congress on Nicaragua's behalf. Somoza's actions throughout
the final two and a half years of his presidency, during which Wilson supported him,
followed the same path that had worked for his family during seven American
presidencies.3
Charles “Charlie” Wilson was elected to the United States House of
Representatives in 1973 to represent Texas's 2nd Congressional district. By the time he
arrived in Washington, his reputation as a hard-drinking womanizer was already well
established. This reputation earned him the nickname of "good time Charlie", an image
2
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that rather than denying he embraced fully. Here was a politician who flew a revolving
door of girlfriends, most much younger than him, around the world at taxpayer expense.
This included taking his dates to warzones and on trips to meet dictators including
Somoza. Despite a lifestyle and chauvinistic statements that would be political suicide for
most politicians, he maintained his seat in Congress. He later claimed that it was his
willingness to admit his faults and not hide his flamboyant lifestyle that allowed him to
maintain the support of his constituents in the piney woods of East Texas, who re-elected
him twelve times from 1973 to his resignation in 1996. As he explained, Christianity was
a religion built on forgiveness which allowed churchgoers to tolerate a confessed, if
unrepentant, sinner. At the same time the country boys and rednecks could live
vicariously through him, while secretly wishing they were able to have as much fun.
Throughout his time in Congress Wilson never forgot to take care of his constituents, "the
home folks", and at times would personally call both state and federal agencies on their
behalf to resolve issues. His ability to use his position in Congress to secure lucrative
government contracts and federal money for the district also reinforced popular support.
Wilson was a liberal when it came to domestic issues such as civil rights or the
economy.4
These liberal domestic politics were combined with a hawkish foreign policy
stance, especially when it came to opposing Communism. Wilson's reputation created the
4
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image of him as a Congressional joke, but beneath the facade was a formidable politician
and fervent anti-Communist with deep personal ambition and a sense of obligation to
oppose any perceived Communist threat. As Gus Avrakotos, the C.I.A. operative who
would become vital to Wilson's covert campaign in Afghanistan during the 1980s, said,
“As I saw it, the tie that bound us together was chasing pussy and killing Communists.”
Wilson's hatred of Communism dated to at least the Vietnam War during which he
blamed the deaths of men from his district on Soviet support for the North Vietnamese.
Furthermore, Wilson came of age during the 1950s when the Cold War was raging. He
graduated from the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, in 1956 and
served in the navy from 1956 to 1960. Both his childhood and time in the navy reinforced
his anti-Communist beliefs. He truly believed that the ultimate goal of the Communists
was to take over the world and that it was the duty of the United States to protect the free
world from the red menace. Wilson's anti-Communist beliefs in defending other nations
from Communist aggression connected with his desire to root for an underdog. Seeing
smaller nations bullied by bigger neighbors, especially if the aggressors had links to
Communism, motivated his foreign policy direction. This desire to assist underdogs
governed Wilson's first foray into foreign policy as a Congressman, not in Nicaragua but
in support of Israel.5

5
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Foreign policy was the side of Congress that got Wilson excited, especially if
there was a chance to oppose Communist expansion or defend an ally of the United
States. Desiring to do both led Wilson to first support Israel and would later fuel his
desire to preserve the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. Beginning with his first term in 1973,
Wilson’s personal desire to support an underdog led him to champion the beleaguered
state of Israel. This tiny American ally surrounded by Soviet-backed enemies provided
Wilson with a cause that suited his own desires to oppose Communist aggression. He
described his passionate support for Israel, "I bought the whole thing - the beleaguered
democracy surrounded by Soviet-armed barbarians - survivors of Nazi concentration
camps - David versus Goliath." Israel was a country filled with underdogs who did not
need or desire America to do their fighting for them, only seeking the material and
financial support to balance the scales with the Soviet aid given to their enemies.6 For
Wilson a similar image could be drawn between Israel and Nicaragua. Like Israel
Nicaragua was a small nation traditionally allied with the United States that appeared to
be surrounded by enemies who were trying to overthrow its government in order to
facilitate a Communist takeover. The support provided to the Marxist-affiliated
Sandinista movement opposed to the Somoza regime by Venezuela, Panama, and Costa
Rica stressed to Wilson the need to preserve American support for their long-standing
ally in Central America.7 Israel played a role in stressing to Wilson the dangers the Carter

6
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Administration’s seemingly soft stance on Communism could have on ties between the
U.S. and Nicaragua. 8
The connections between the Somoza dynasty and the United States began with
Anastasio "Tacho" Somoza, the patriarch of the dynasty, who used his position as
commander of the U.S.-created Guardia Nacional to take power in 1936 with American
backing. President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized Somoza as the legitimate leader of
Nicaragua despite the coup. Allegedly his comments on the Nicaraguan leader included
"Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.”9 This statement epitomized
the position that Wilson would take decades later that the Somoza dynasty deserved
American support despite its flaws because any Somoza usually was America’s typical
ally in Central America.10 The key feature of this relationship was Nicaragua's
willingness to vote in lock step with the United States in both the United Nations and the
Organization of American States. This included joining the U.S. to support the creation of
the State of Israel.11 The Somoza family maintained a network of paid lobbyists in the
U.S., who allowed the regime to exert considerable influence on American policy. Luiz
Somoza, the older brother of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was investigated by the Justice
Department in the early 1960s for suspected influence peddling in Congress through this
8
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network of lobbyists, illustrating the effort that the Somoza family placed on maintaining
its favorable status with the American government.12
The dynasty was also staunchly anti-Communist and, following the 1959 Cuban
Revolution, anti-Fidel Castro. Nicaragua was used as a staging point for the Bay of Pigs
operation, further demonstrating the dynasty's opposition to any expansion of
Communism in Latin America, mirroring U.S. policy before the election of Jimmy
Carter. Being vocal anti-Communists and strong supporters of American policy allowed
the regime's corruption and brutality to be ignored by many in the United States. America
looked the other way, as it did in numerous countries including Egypt and Israel, in order
to maintain relations and preserve an ally that was seen as vital to regional security.13 It
was through the continuation of the Somoza Lobby that Wilson was recruited to protect
American support for the dynasty. his position on the House Appropriations Committee
made him a valuable ally in the fight to keep U.S. aid flowing to Nicaragua.14
Anastasio Somoza Debayle maintained his own sense of agency throughout his
time in power. He continued the policy of courting the good will of the United States that
was used by both his father and older brother during their own times in power because it
was valuable to him. The image of American support provided legitimacy to his regime
both at home and abroad, undermining the ability of the Nicaraguan opposition to
12
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threaten the regime.15 American aid, both military and civilian, pumped millions of
dollars into the Nicaraguan economy, which he and his family dominated. In turn,
Somoza spent millions of dollars cultivating and maintaining a network of lobbyists in
Washington, D.C.16 This lobby included prominent law firms with direct access to the
floor of Congress as well as Rep. John Murphy, D-NY, who was a childhood friend of
Somoza. They also included Raymond Molina, a Cuban exile who took part in the Bay of
Pigs. It was through this network and particularly Fred Korth, a Texas businessman and
former Secretary of the Navy, that Wilson would be brought on board.17 The desire to
maintain U.S. support led Nicaragua to be a guaranteed vote in both the United Nations
and the Organization of American States for the United States.18
His direct access to the floor of Congress set Somoza apart from other Latin
American governments that lobbied the U.S.19 When the Sandinistas became a real threat
to his government Somoza sent numerous witnesses to testify before Congress regarding
their links to Cuba. Under previous administrations any connection between an
opposition group and Cuba would have ensured U.S. support for the government.
However, Carter had changed the rules with his insistence on human rights. In response
to these changes Somoza allowed the opposition newspaper La Prensa to remain open in
order to create the image that he was not a dictator. The presence of a seemingly free

15
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press was used by his supporters, including Wilson, as proof that Nicaragua was not a
repressive society.20 Under previous administrations this campaign would have succeeded
in maintaining U.S. support. Despite State Department pressure Somoza refused to accept
an American-backed peace deal between his government and the opposition. He
eventually fled Nicaragua in 1979 only after the military situation had become hopeless.21
Both Wilson and Somoza acted in accordance with their own agendas, and both of
their political views were shaped by the worlds they came from. Wilson was a traditional
anti-Communist who sought to oppose Communism whenever possible. This included
preserving regimes, like Somoza’s, allied with America who opposed Communism
despite any flaws they might have. Wilson’s anti-Communist beliefs pre-dated his
support for Somoza and continued after Somoza’s fall. The efforts of Somoza’s lobby
convinced Wilson to aid Somoza’s cause in Congress. Without the influence of this lobby
it is likely that Wilson would have chosen another area of foreign policy to focus on.
Possibly this could have meant additional efforts in support of Israel, who Wilson would
support throughout his time in Congress. At the same time Somoza was following the
tried and tested path laid down by his father and older brother to maintain U.S. support
for over forty years. Stressing the Communist and especially Cuban ties of opposition
groups attempting to oust them from power had proven to be a useful tool for keeping
Washington on the regime's side. However, both men found themselves fighting an uphill
20
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battle in a changing American political climate. The election of Carter and the backlash
from both the Vietnam War and Watergate had weakened U.S. public support for
traditional military strongmen like Somoza. The corruption and brutality associated with
these regimes was seen as weakening America’s moral standing abroad and as a relic of a
misguided past, especially among the left-wing of the Democratic Party. Despite these
obstacles Wilson and Somoza soldiered on trying to hold the line against a supposed
Communist takeover in the hope that American opinion and policy would swing back in
their favor.

10

Chapter One
Wilson and Somoza, 1977: Confronting Policy Bias and Legislative Success
The U.S. Presidential election of 1977 revealed a split within American politics
over how foreign policy should be conducted. President Jimmy Carter incorporated
human rights into American foreign policy in an attempt to break with the militancy of
the Vietnam War era by using American financial aid, including military assistance, as
leverage to force regimes to make political reforms. This was a shift away from decades
of established U.S. support for dictatorial and totalitarian regimes regardless of their
brutality, as long as they supported American interests.22 However, the administration's
focus on the Middle East left the crafting of foreign policy towards Latin America to, as
Wilson described them, "adolescent anarchists" running the State Department.23 It was
this group and the lack of attention paid to other regions, including Nicaragua, by the
administration that he sought to challenge through his support for Somoza.
Carter's shift towards human rights reflected his own belief in the policy and that
American support for totalitarian regimes undermined national security by encouraging
Communism. Many of his political appointments were shaped ideologically by their
disenchantment following both the Vietnam War and Watergate. Carter and his
administration did not share the fervent anti-Communist zeal of past administrations and
22

LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 21-24.
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Massachusetts Press, 1989), 206-207.
23
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sought to build a dialogue with both Castro's Cuba and the Soviet Union. The refusal to
ignore the human rights abuses committed by its allies directly undermined U.S. support
for Nicaragua. This unwillingness to oppose any potential Communist expansion left the
administration vulnerable to attacks from hawks in both parties. To traditional antiCommunists like Wilson, Carter's shift on foreign policy went against their fundamental
belief that Communism had to be opposed at every turn.24
The ideological split between Carter and Wilson on foreign policy went beyond
the question of human rights. It illustrates the different reactions both men had following
the Vietnam War and its impact on American foreign policy. Furthermore, it highlighted
the different image of America both men sought to build through foreign policy. Carter
sought to use human rights to craft a new image and moral high ground for U.S. foreign
policy. He wanted to pull away from the traditional view of military might providing the
foundation for international relations between the United States and the rest of the world.
The traditional support of totalitarian regimes was seen as fueling both anti-American
sentiment and encouraging support for Communism. Carter’s policy of pulling away
from regimes like Somoza’s through human rights was driven by a desire to reverse both
this anti-Americanism and support for Communism.
Wilson took the opposite approach to foreign policy, believing that the U.S. had
to maintain its traditional support for allied regimes who opposed Communism. His
opinions don’t form out of a lack of concern for human rights, but from viewing these
24
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concerns as secondary to his opposition to Communism. He adhered to the traditional
pre-Vietnam view of the Cold War in which containing any expansion of Communism
was vital to American national security. The ability and willingness of the U.S. to oppose
Communism was the foundation of its geopolitical status as a super power. Defeat in
Vietnam made it appear as though America was losing the Cold War in the late 1970s.
Wilson’s support for Somoza and his attempts to pressure Carter to return the U.S. to its
traditional anti-Communist foreign policy, was a means of restoring America’s image of
strength in the face of Communist aggression.
Wilson came from the same school of Cold War anti-Communism that had been
embraced by Presidents Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson. His
political views combined policy a liberal domestic agenda with a hawkish foreign policy
centered on opposing any expansion of Communism. Domestically Wilson supported
civil rights, the Equal Rights Amendment, and sponsored a government land seizure to
establish the Big Thicket National Preserve in East Texas. He compensated for this with a
hawkish foreign policy built on opposing Communism. Wilson’s political views shared
similarities with those of Senator William Fulbright and other Vietnam War doves.
Fulbright had compensated for his dovish views on Vietnam by staunchly opposing civil
rights at home. In the same way, Wilson’s aggressive anti-Communist stance on foreign
policy compensated for any push back he could receive from conservatives on the
domestic front.

13

For Wilson and like-minded politicians, Communism had to be confronted, rolled
back if possible, but at the very least contained. Any sign of weakness on the part of the
United States would encourage the Communist bloc to expand its influence. It was
accepted that in order to carry out this anti-Communist agenda, the United States would
be required to support regimes whose policies were not democratic. Military dictatorships
such as Egypt or autocratic monarchies like Saudi Arabia were embraced or at least
tolerated because they served a purpose. As long as it served the strategic interests of
America or its allies in their global struggle against Communism, flaws in potential allies
were to be ignored for the perceived greater good. To a politician like Wilson, the
Somoza dynasty had to be protected despite its flaws because it was an ally in the
struggle against Communism. His attack on the application of human rights was that
Nicaragua was singled out for punishment because it was seen as less strategically
valuable than oil rich countries in the Middle East. Carter's desire to connect human
rights to U.S. foreign policy represented a danger to the system of alliances that had been
cultivated over decades by multiple American administrations.25 Opposition to the biased
application of this new human rights agenda lay at the heart of Wilson's eventual support
for Somoza.
Wilson first attacked the new human rights agenda used by the Carter State
Department to cut aid for Somoza and Nicaragua from multiple angles. He and other
critics challenged what they viewed as the double standard present in the application of
25
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human rights in U.S. foreign policy by which smaller nations who lacked the ability to
resist were used as scapegoats while more powerful countries with similar records were
ignored. The Somoza government faced the loss of American aid for its human rights
record, while Middle Eastern regimes with equally bad or worse records, such as Egypt
or Saudi Arabia, continued to receive assistance.26 Personal anger over this double
standard led Wilson to become the leading advocate for the Somoza government in 1977.
For Wilson, not only was Nicaragua a small Latin American nation that lacked oil, it was
also a staunch U.S. ally being thrown under the bus after decades of loyal support to the
United States. The administration’s willingness to sacrifice Somoza, a U.S. ally, by
removing continued support in the face of a growing threat from the Sandinista rebels in
Nicaragua, a group Wilson viewed as Marxist, reeked of appeasement. The White House
was failing to support its friends while attempting to build bridges with its Communist
enemies in Cuba and Vietnam. The refusal of the State Department to assist Somoza
against a Communist insurgency in Wilson’s mind invited and encouraged additional
Communist aggression by Cuba into Central America. He believed that the
administration was risking another Cuba forming in the region.27 Wilson's support for
Somoza was based on his own anti-Communist views and a belief that the United States
should support its allies and not from any personal affection for the man himself.

26
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Wilson is Recruited by the Somoza Lobby
By March 1977 Wilson and a small group of likeminded northern and southern
Democrats, as well as Republicans, had become increasingly outraged at what they
perceived to be the appeasement policy of Jimmy Carter. Carter’s fundamental shift away
from America’s established Cold War policy of opposition and distrust of Communist
regimes and revolutions, towards a desire to negotiate and tolerate leftist regimes and
revolutions, was viewed as a direct threat to American national security. The exact person
that got Wilson involved with supporting Somoza is debated by writers on the subject,
when they mention him at all. George Crile credits the combination of Wilson’s own
anti-Communist beliefs with the Israeli government's concerns over the Carter
administration’s weakness on opposing Communism.28 However, Lars Shoultz and
Wilson himself credits Fred Korth, a former Secretary of the Navy and Texas banker, for
bringing Nicaragua to his attention. Korth was a registered lobbyist and part of a
sophisticated network paid to maintain American support and financial aid to Nicaragua
by peddling influence in the halls of Congress. Wilson claims that prior to meeting Korth,
he knew little about Nicaragua or Somoza.29 Regardless of who turned him on to
Nicaragua, Wilson’s primary motivations were personal.
The timing of Korth's approach was crucial. By 1977 Wilson was looking for a
place to pick a fight with the Carter administration on foreign policy. He sought to

28
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challenge the "flaming radical left" he believed had taken control of the State Department
following Carter's election.30 Wilson repeatedly railed against what he believed was a
lack of attention paid to Latin America by the Carter administration. Carter's foreign
policy was focused on the Middle East and trying to improve relations with the Soviet
Union. This left policy towards Latin America in the hands of lesser officials and
bureaucrats within the State Department, whom Wilson referred to as "incompetent,
leftist ideologues". In his opinion there was no one voicing a centrist view in foreign
policy. It was with this group of leftists that he would clash in his efforts to maintain
American support to Somoza.31 To Wilson the Democratic Party's shift to the left placed
the United States and the rest of the free world at risk, because it encouraged Communist
aggression. America's withdrawal of support for traditional right-wing allies because of
human rights abuses was viewed as an invitation for leftist guerrillas and revolutionaries,
sponsored by the Soviet Union and Cuba, to seize power. Wilson and other likeminded
members of Congress saw their resistance to the administration's policy as a holding
action, keeping the line against Communism until the executive branch came to its
senses.32 Defending continued support for the Somoza regime in Nicaragua simply
became the place Wilson decided to make his stand.
The influence of the Somoza Lobby in gaining Wilson as an ally was crucial.
Wilson stated that prior to meeting Korth he had no knowledge of Nicaragua. This lack of

30
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knowledge makes it highly unlikely that without the lobby Wilson would have become
involved in Nicaragua. The success in recruiting him to aid Somoza rested on the
combination of the lobbyists efforts and Wilson’s on anti-Communist ideals. He was a
fervent anti-Communist, and so when Korth brought the withdrawal of U.S. support for
Somoza to his attention, Wilson found a battle that suited his own beliefs. Had he not
been persuaded to make his stand in Nicaragua, Wilson would have chosen another
country to feed his desire to oppose Communism. The lobby also supplied him with
information/propaganda that supported the regime’s claims that Nicaragua was being
unfairly singled out by the State Department for human rights abuses. Wilson’s views
began to mirror those expressed in the information supplied by the lobby. His
congressional papers on Nicaragua are filled with this pro-Somoza propaganda. How
much this information campaign influenced Wilson’s opinions on U.S. policy towards
Nicaragua, or simply provided support for his own pre-defined beliefs is debatable.
However, the amount of propaganda compared to the amount of State Department
supplied information in his papers provides evidence for which sources he chose to rely
on.
At the heart of Wilson's opposition to Carter's foreign policy shift was the
administration's willingness to publicly abandon traditional allies, such as Somoza, in the
face of Communist aggression and the clear double standard present in how human rights
was applied globally. Unless the policy was applied equally towards every nation with
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similar records, it would lack credibility.33 Nicaragua under the Somoza dynasty had been
a close American ally since 1936 when Anastasio "Tacho" Somoza, the patriarch of the
regime, took power. Nicaragua had continuously voted in lock-step with the United
States in both the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Every
President from Franklin Roosevelt to Gerald Ford had maintained some level of U.S.
support for the dynasty despite any claims of human rights violations or corruption.
Supporting the Somozas and similar regimes was deemed vital to American national
security for decades prior to the election of Jimmy Carter.34
The push by the new administration, especially the human rights bureau within
the State Department, to significantly cut foreign aid to Somoza alarmed and angered
Wilson. Foreign aid was not simply a means of rewarding allied governments, but also a
public show of support for those regimes. The administration's push to cut aid for
Nicaragua, including military assistance, beginning in 1977 was out of a desire to punish
Somoza and his government for alleged human rights violations. For Wilson this attack
on the Nicaraguan regime was a slap in the face of an established U.S. ally in the fight
against global Communism. In his mind this betrayal of the Somoza family following
decades of support for U.S. policy, including permitting the Bay of Pigs to be staged in
Nicaragua, was a violation of American duty to support friendly governments. To
Wilson, Nicaragua was being used to test the implementation of human rights into
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American foreign policy and to appease the far left of the Democratic Party whose foot
soldiers had flooded the State Department.35
The presence of the Sandinistas, a leftist revolutionary group backed by Cuba
attempting to overthrow Somoza, added fuel to Wilson's opposition to cuts in American
support. The Sandinistas had existed for years, but began to gain momentum at the same
time Carter's State Department moved to restrict military aid to Somoza. For antiCommunist Cold Warriors such as Wilson, the greatest geopolitical fear in the Western
Hemisphere was the creation of a second Cuba. This fear was stoked by the Castro
government’s public desire to spread its anti-American Communist revolution throughout
Latin America. Preventing a second Cuba went hand-in-hand with the traditional U.S.
policy of containing the spread of Communism.36 The presence of an active Marxist
revolutionary group, linked to Cuba, inside Nicaragua made withdrawal of American
support galling to Wilson. In his eyes the United States was not only betraying an antiCommunist ally, but also encouraging a Communist takeover. The failure of the leftist
appointees, placed into the State Department by Carter, to understand the delicate
geopolitical situation placed not only American national security but all of Latin America
at risk.37 Wilson’s clash with the Carter administration was a reflection of the continuing
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battle between politicians seeking to attain a moral high ground in foreign policy and
those like Wilson who favored realpolitik.

Human Rights Battle in Congress: Wilson Secures Aid
In Congress, members from the Carter human rights faction, as well as those like
Wilson who believed in continued U.S. support for the Somoza government, held
hearings to present evidence of their claims. The most significant of these occurred
before the House Appropriations Sub-Committee, which Wilson was a member of, on
April 5th, 1977. Rep. Ed Koch invited a group of Nicaraguans who opposed the Somoza
government, organized by the anti-Somoza organization the Washington Office for Latin
America or W.O.L.A., to testify before the committee. The group was led by Cardinal
Miguel D'Ecosta, a leading figure inside the Catholic Church in Nicaragua, an outspoken
critic of the Somoza government and a Sandinista sympathizer. The primary purpose of
this group was to provide evidence of the ongoing violence and brutality of the regime,
especially the Nicaraguan National Guard. The National Guard, or Guardia Nacional, was
7,500 men strong and was the primary ally of the Somoza family. The dynasty had
retained control of the military throughout its reign, and Somoza continued to hold the
position as commander of the army as well as the presidency. Most of the officers were
trained by the United States either in the Panama Canal Zone or in America itself. With
his position as a cardinal giving his testimony additional weight and an appearance of
legitimacy, D’Ecosta and his fellow opposition leaders painted a picture of corruption
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and brutal repression directed by and carried out to benefit Somoza, his family, and inner
circle. Their ultimate goal was to undermine the relationship between the United States
and Nicaragua through the use of human rights allegations. Throughout their testimony
they downplayed the violence of the Sandinistas and their links to Fidel Castro's Cuba.38
Minimizing any links to Communism was critical, because traditionally many State
Department officials would have used those links to justify continued support for any
government opposing Communism, as they had with Nicaragua for decades. Eliminating
American support for Somoza was crucial if the Sandinistas were to remove him from
power. Their lobbying of Congress illustrated an understanding of American domestic
politics and the hegemonic power wielded by the United States in the Western
Hemisphere.
Pushing back against this damaging testimony, Wilson sought to discredit both
the opposition witnesses and claims of human rights abuses. Supporters of Somoza used
D'Ecosta's established ties to the Sandinistas, a group backed by Communist Cuba, as
evidence of his own Communist beliefs.39 D’Ecosta’s own declared desire for a new
revolutionary, non-capitalist system in Nicaragua provided evidence to support claims
that he was a Communist.40 In Wilson’s opinion these claims of human rights abuses
were the creation of "radical preachers", like D'Ecosta, who sought to stir anti-Somoza
sentiment both in Nicaragua and the United States. These radicals sought to undermine
38
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American support for Somoza in order to hand the country over to a Communist
revolution.41 In the eyes of traditional Cold Warriors, like Wilson, any personal
connections or support to Communist-linked groups by critics was seen as proof of their
personal Communist beliefs. Wilson’s attempts to paint critics such as D'Ecosta as
Communist were reflection of his adherence to the traditional American Cold War
ideology in which naming someone a Communist robbed them of legitimacy and
nullified their message.42 Under any previous administration this argument would have
been enough to discredit critics of Somoza and push the human rights issue to the
background. However, Vietnam and Watergate had shifted American public opinion
towards the left, frustrating Wilson’s attempts to employ traditional anti-Communist
rhetoric to undermine the credibility of Somoza’s critics.
In May and early June of 1977, Wilson had personal meetings with several
registered lobbyists for the Somoza government. Among these were meetings on May 6th
and May 18th with Raymond Molina, a Cuban exile and veteran of the Bay of Pigs, who
was the chairman of "Citizens for the Truth about Nicaragua". He was also the president
of "Concreto Permezclade de Nicaragua", the only concrete company in Nicaragua and
owned by Somoza.43 Molina also sent Wilson a letter which included fact sheets to
demonstrate how the violence plaguing Nicaragua was orchestrated by the Marxist-
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dominated Sandinistas.44 Wilson also met on June 6th with Charles Lipson, an American
lawyer who worked for a firm hired by Somoza. The hiring of American lawyers and
recruiting lobbyists in America derived from Somoza's understanding of U.S. politics and
also indicated the seriousness with which he viewed any threat to his relationship with
Washington. The opposition to Somoza also sought out Wilson with Valerie Miller of
W.O.L.A. meeting with him on May 17th.45 The exact content of these meetings may be
unknown, but their timing was vital because during May and June of 1977 U.S. military
aid to Nicaragua was under threat on Capitol Hill, and Wilson was to play a leading role
in this fight.
Wilson’s first major victory on behalf of Somoza was his ability to restore
roughly three million dollars of military aid credits for Nicaragua in June of 1977.
Supporters of Carter’s human rights agenda on the House Appropriations Committee, led
by Rep. Ed Koch, had removed the money from the U.S. Military Assistance Bill for the
1978 fiscal year. This withdrawal of funds was a direct attempt to pressure Somoza to
address the human rights violations his government was repeatedly accused of
committing. Nicaragua was included along with Brazil, El Salvador, Argentina,
Guatemala, and Chile in a list of Latin American countries prohibited from receiving
military aid, all of which were governed by right-wing governments. Wilson initially
attempted to restore the funds during debates on the Appropriations Committee on June
44
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12th and 13th. However, efforts failed to secure the desired result with his motion being
defeated at both the sub-committee and full committee levels. His second attempt to
restore the military aid credits was before the full Appropriations Committee, but it failed
to pass by a single vote. This left Wilson with only a last-ditch effort to restore the funds
during the final debates of the bill before the entire House of Representatives. On June
23rd, 1977, Wilson offered one of the shortest amendments in history saying simply, "On
page 20, line 21, of the bill in section 505, delete 'Nicaragua'." The bill passed with his
changes intact by a vote of 225 to 180. By taking out a single word and removing
Nicaragua from the list of countries prohibited from receiving aid, Wilson secured
millions of American dollars for Somoza.46
Wilson's success in changing the foreign aid bill was proof of his political skill.
Despite his "good time Charlie" reputation, which was fully justified, Wilson was a
natural politician. The fact that he had secured a position on the Appropriation
Committee while still a junior member of Congress demonstrated his skill as a legislator
His power in Congress was built on his ability to horse trade votes with fellow members,
allowing him to secure support for pet projects including aid to Somoza. This horse
trading was a reflection of Congress during the late 1970s when party lines were not
rigidly set in stone. During his time aiding Somoza, Wilson had both bi-partisan support
and opposition.
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Wilson's comments following the vote on the June 23rd clearly illustrated his
opinion of Nicaragua and the entire issue of human rights in American foreign policy. In
his opinion the only crime of which Somoza and Nicaragua could be found guilty was
being friendly towards the United States.47 La Prensa, the largest newspaper in the
country, was allowed to operate despite the fact that Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal
was a vocal critic of the Somoza regime. The presence of an apparently free press, even
one hostile to the government, became a central tool for Wilson in his efforts to disprove
claims of human rights violations in Nicaragua. If Somoza was the cruel dictator the left
painted him to be, Wilson questioned why he would permit an opposition paper to
operate within his country. Wilson also used the testimony of the regime’s critics as
evidence for his claims that Somoza was not the tyrant the left painted him as. Opponents
of the regime were even allowed to travel to the United States and testify before Congress
about the abuses carried out by the Somoza government and then allowed to return
home.48 The ability for Nicaraguans who opposed the regime to operate with apparent
freedom provided Wilson with ammunition to attack claims of Somoza violating human
rights.
At the same time, he took the opportunity to rail against what he saw as the
unequal application of the new human rights agenda being pushed by the left. All of the
Latin American countries singled out to be stripped of military assistance were right-wing
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governments. At the same time other nations with equal or worse claims of human rights
violations were still allowed to receive American aid. Israel, whom Wilson vehemently
defended as not being a violator of human rights regardless of claims made by leftist
media outlets, was not targeted for aid cuts. This was despite claims that Israel was
violating human rights through its occupation of the West Bank and the torture of Arab
prisoners. Wilson argued that journalists looking for a story or a few dissidents making
accusations of human rights violations did not make them true. He also pointed out that
roughly one third of the money in the bill was going to countries that had been accused of
similar actions as Nicaragua. In fact, even the United States had been accused of violating
human rights by Amnesty International, the primary international organization that
campaigned for human rights. Wilson argued that if the Carter administration was going
to push a foreign policy based on human rights the policy had to be administered equally
around the world. It could not be used as a weapon to single out right-wing regimes or a
single country. Furthermore, if it was going to be used to single out a particular country it
should not be one of America's closest friends in the Western Hemisphere.49

The State Department Sends Mixed Signals on Human Rights
During Wilson’s attempts to restore U.S. military assistance to the Somoza
regime, the State Department sent a series of confusing signals regarding its preferred
outcome. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Charles Bray and Deputy
49
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Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Lawrence Pezzullo both sought
Wilson's support in convincing Koch not to introduce his amendment cutting military aid
to Nicaragua in exchange for the State Department’s pledge not to renew the military
assistance agreement with Nicaragua unless the human rights issues were addressed. This
renewal was required by the end of the 1977 fiscal year to authorize continued military
assistance.50 Seeking Wilson’s help, and the request to Koch not to introduce his
legislation, caused confusion among the human rights faction which thought that Carter
and the State Department were pushing for additional pressure on Somoza to correct
human rights abuses. Rep. Koch wrote a letter to Carter in which he accused the State
Department of undermining the entire human rights agenda, and potentially jeopardizing
any hope for improvements.51
However, at the same time the State Department was pushing to keep aid to
Nicaragua, it withheld information that could have helped make its case. On May 27th,
the American embassy in Nicaragua sent a cable showing improvements in human rights
and evidence contradicting the testimony of Cardinal D'Ecosta and other critics who had
testified before Congress. This information was not shared with Wilson or other members
of Congress prior to the votes on military assistance.52 The State Department’s
withholding of this information was either clear evidence that it was attempting to aid
Koch and anti-Somoza figures or a serious error within the bureaucracy. The lack of a
50
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clear policy and united front on human rights within the State Department created a lane
for Wilson to exploit in his efforts to aid Somoza though sending mixed signals on the
human rights agenda.
This bureaucratic confusion, alongside the fact that Nicaragua was not a priority
for the Carter Administration, played into Wilson’s hands during 1977. Members of
Congress who joined with him and supported aid to Somoza faced few questions from
voters in their districts.53 This made them willing to follow Wilson’s lead or trade votes
with him for their own pet projects because they faced little personal risk. The lack of
direct involvement in Nicaraguan policy by top officials in the Carter Administration
prevented the formation of a firm anti-Somoza view taking hold in Congress. Wilson
railed against what he saw as the preoccupation with the Middle East and U.S.-Soviet
relations that left policy towards Nicaragua in the hands of leftist political appointees.54
However, this lack of focus on the Somoza regime enabled him to rally the support he
needed in Congress to keep aid flowing. In many ways his efforts to bring Nicaragua to
the attention of senior White House and State Department officials eventually weakened
his ability to aid Somoza. Wilson never appears to have realized this fact.
The mixed signals sent by the State Department and the failure to craft a clear
policy towards human rights was influenced by the big tent nature of the Democratic
Party. The Carter Administration had to keep support from both conservative members
like Wilson, and more liberal Democrats such as Koch. This necessity combined with
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pressure from Wilson and the Somoza Lobby forced State Department officials to
compromise on aid to Somoza. The administration was unwilling to fully commit to
either side because doing so would risk party support for more important issues.
Nicaragua was not a priority for top officials in either the White House or State
Department and it was not worth risking their wider agenda to alienate one wing of the
party or the other. Wilson benefits from this pressure because it forces his opponents in
the State department to give in to his demands or at least water down their policy towards
Somoza.
During the debates surrounding the foreign aid bill for 1978 and military
assistance to Nicaragua, Wilson also sought additional means to secure funds for
Somoza. The primary source for this aid would come from military aid credits that
Congress had already approved but had yet to allocate to Nicaragua.55 Because these
funds had already been approved by Congress, they would not require a vote. This
presented Wilson with the possibility for generating aid for Nicaragua while avoiding a
protracted battle with the human rights faction in Congress. However, his success in
restoring military aid for Nicaragua to the bill made this method unnecessary.
Wilson’s victory in June made him a figurehead of the Somoza Lobby and
brought him to the attention of the Nicaraguan ruler. Following his success in restoring
the $3.1 million in military aid, Wilson received a personal letter of thanks from Somoza.
The letter celebrated Wilson for his continued support and stressed his commitment to
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fighting Communists. Somoza blamed leftists and Communists for using human rights as
a tool to undermine his government.56 Wilson took the July 4th recess as an opportunity
to travel to Nicaragua with Rep. John Murphy and other likeminded colleagues as part of
a fact-finding mission to Central America. Travelling to foreign countries and hot zones
being debated in Congress was a useful method for Wilson to increase the power of his
arguments. Most members of Congress were not foreign policy experts, although some
attempted to become experts on one or two countries. This lack of personal information
led them to follow the lead of fellow members who appeared more knowledgeable. The
fact that Nicaragua was not a major issue in 1977 contributed to this lack of
understanding. Being able to claim personal firsthand knowledge of the regions and
persons of interests gave Wilson’s criticism or support added weight compared to his
colleagues who relied solely on secondhand or thirdhand evidence.57
During his visit Wilson met and dined with Somoza, the first face-to-face meeting
between them. According to Crile, during this meeting after dinner, Somoza offered
Wilson $50,000 dollars as payment for his support on the aid bill. Wilson claimed that he
“didn't take the fucking money". He told Somoza he didn't need any money at that time,
but he didn't turn it down completely, telling Somoza he might need some at a later date.
Despite the awkwardness that followed his refusal of the money, Wilson came to like
Somoza. Somoza's connections to America through his time at West Point appealed to
Wilson, who was formerly in the Navy. The strongest connection between Wilson and
56
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Somoza was their shared support of Israel and a mutual fear of what would happen if
Carter's human rights agenda was allowed to progress unchecked. Strengthened by both
his personal meeting and information from his friends in Israel, Wilson became even
more convinced that Somoza was far less dangerous than what might follow if the
Communist Sandinistas were allowed to take over.58
Wilson also launched a series of personal attacks against supporters of the human
rights policy who criticized his support of aid to Somoza. He labeled them "real kooky
leftwingers," "flaky," "spacey priests,” and "weird professors." He also claimed that Rep.
Ed Koch had only tried to cut military aid because he hoped to use the legislation to
garner support for his bid to become mayor of New York City.59 Essentially Wilson was
arguing that anyone who opposed his efforts on behalf of Nicaragua were either crazy or
had personal ulterior motives. Furthermore, to traditional Cold Warriors, like Wilson,
such leftists translated to Communists or at least Communist sympathizers. Hinting that
his critics could have connections to Communism was a useful method for undermining
their credibility and weakening the effects of their criticism.
The next major clash over funding to Nicaragua came in September of 1977. On
September 17th, President Somoza lifted the "State of Siege" that had been in place since
1974 and restored most constitutional rights. Wilson and fellow supporters of Somoza
pointed to this as evidence of Somoza making positive changes in Nicaragua. September
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marked the end of the 1977 fiscal year, and the renewal of the military assistance
agreement between the United States and Nicaragua was required or aid payments would
lapse. Also at stake was $2.5 million in military assistance and an additional $12 million
in humanitarian and economic aid.60 The battle lines in the House of Representatives
remained the same as in June, with Wilson leading the Somoza lobby. Human rights
supporters demanded a suspension in all military aid in response to claims of continued
abuses by the Nicaraguan National Guard.
The State Department felt a need to demonstrate its commitment to human rights
following its about-face on the Military Assistance Bill in June. However, cutting
military aid required multiple agencies to sign off on the decision. National security and
defense concerns had to be weighed before any military aid could be given or removed.
Cutting humanitarian aid required less red tape, making it easier to remove from the bill.
Warren Christopher, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, had the unofficial
final word on human rights issues and aid. Christopher decided to sign the renewal
agreement and allow the $2.5 million in military aid to be released as a signal to Somoza
recognizing the lifting of the state of siege. However, the two loans equaling $12 million
in humanitarian and economic aid were suspended indefinitely until long term progress
was shown on human rights in Nicaragua.61 Once again the lack of a defined policy led
the administration to send mixed signals on its human rights agenda.
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Both supporters and critics of human rights-based foreign policy blasted the
decision. Granting military aid while withdrawing loans earmarked for educational and
nutritional programs aimed at helping the poorest Nicaraguan peasants provided further
evidence of the lack of a policy that matched the rhetoric. Nicaragua was being used as a
laboratory to test the implementation of human rights, and the administration appeared to
be bumbling along with no clear direction.62 This decision to grant military aid to
Somoza, while withholding humanitarian aid on human rights grounds, further
undermined the credibility of the policy. Wilson seized the opportunity presented by this
additional policy blunder to launch renewed attacks against the lack of State Department
support for Somoza.
Wilson attacked the decision as another example of the State Department’s double
standard in applying human rights and singling out Nicaragua. Other African and Latin
American countries had their aid suspended for human rights reasons, but by September
Nicaragua was the only country whose aid had not been restored by the end of the 1977
fiscal year. Even State Department officials on the ground in Nicaragua did not
understand why the aid had been cut. They claimed that the human rights situation had
improved since the state of siege had been lifted.63 Once again the willingness of the
State Department to ignore evidence from Nicaragua that refuted claims of human rights
abuses meant that either it was bumbling the policy or actively trying to help push the
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human rights agenda. For Wilson the State Department had withheld aid for the poor
until renewed violence in Nicaragua provided a convenient technical reason to
permanently suspend the loans, while in reality this suspension was done for domestic
American political reasons.64 Somoza was being punished despite proof that the situation
in Nicaragua had improved allegedly because the State Department felt compelled to
prove to the far left of the Democratic Party that it was committed to the idea of human
rights. Wilson's stated belief that the State Department itself was an infected nest of
members of the "flaming radical left" reinforced his frustrations with this biased covert
political agenda against Somoza.65

Media Coverage: Bias and Conspiracy against Somoza
Wilson and Somoza also believed that this bias against the Nicaraguan
government extended to how the regime was portrayed in the American media. Wilson
became convinced that the same bias against Somoza that he fought in Congress was also
present in American media coverage of the regime. Stories about the corruption and
violence of the Somoza dynasty were given front-page coverage. At the same time stories
that covered the Communist links of the Sandinistas or violence committed by them
against the regime were buried in later section of newspapers if they were covered at
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all.66 This represented a willingness among left-wing publications to accept that not all
revolutions were evil even if they had ties to Communism. It also illustrated the shift
away from the traditional view of the Cold War in which revolution had equaled
Communism and any government opposing revolution was to be supported. This was a
reflection of the position of the Carter Administration and provided the White House with
apparent support for its desire to distance the United States from rulers like Somoza. It
was this shift away from the traditional Cold War view, that anything linked to
Communism was bad and had to be opposed, that Wilson was fighting in his support for
Somoza.
Supporters of the Somoza regime, including Wilson, and even Somoza himself
viewed this biased coverage as evidence of a conspiracy by the left-wing media against
Nicaragua. Through his American-based propaganda arm the Nicaraguan Government
Information Office, directed by Ian R. Mackenzie, Somoza sent various news articles
directly to Wilson that stressed this bias. These articles even alleged that the left-wing
American media supposedly ignored the support given to the Sandinistas by the
Nicaraguan church, which also helped spread anti-Somoza propaganda.67 This biased
picture painted by the mainstream media was viewed as a conspiracy against Somoza. It
was seen as a coordinated effort between left-wing American politicians and media
sources to use human rights to undermine U.S. support for Nicaragua. The Washington
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Post and particularly columnist Jack Anderson's articles that portrayed Somoza as a
violent and corrupt dictator were placed on the front page. However, reports on terrorist
attacks carried out by the Sandinistas were buried deeper in the paper making them less
likely to be widely read.68 For Somoza and Wilson, the newspapers' image of not giving
equal coverage to violence committed by the Somoza regime and that carried out by
Sandinistas created an unbalanced view of the situation in Nicaragua among the
American public. This skewed picture had the potential to alter public support for the
Somoza government and threaten U.S. support as a result.69
Somoza was aware of this biased view of his regime among American media
outlets and made an effort to address it both through his lobbying network and by giving
personal interviews to American journalists.70 In one of these interviews, carried in the
Washington Star, he described the attacks on his government as an international
Communist conspiracy. The goal of this conspiracy was to destroy the elected
government of Nicaragua and the close alliance between it and the United States. He
reinforced the connections between the Sandinistas and both Communist Cuba and the
Soviet Union. Somoza also discussed the ability of the Sandinistas to operate out of
border regions in Honduras and Costa Rica. However, he did not directly blame the
governments of Honduras or Costa Rica for these bases. He also claimed that U.S. loans
to Nicaragua were withheld for political reasons despite the long-standing support given
68

Paul Scott, "Destroying a Friendly Government", The Wanderer, (Saint Paul), November 18, 1977, C.W.
Collection, Box 1 Folder 45.
69
Both of these articles were sent to Wilson by Ian R. Mackenzie.
70
Somoza, Nicaragua Betrayed, 204-206.

37

to America.71 Somoza's efforts to link his critics to Communism followed the same
school of thought of traditional Cold Warriors that doing so undermined their credibility.
It was also an attempt to create the idea that Nicaragua and the United States shared
common enemies. His willingness to speak directly to American journalists, and through
them to the American public, demonstrated his understanding of the importance of public
opinion and the media in shaping State Department policy.
The Congressional struggle over aid to Somoza continued into 1978 along similar lines.
Wilson would continue to stress the double standard present in the application of the
State Department's human rights agenda. However, as conditions in Nicaragua worsened
and the Sandinista insurgency grew into civil war, the Somoza Lobby found itself waging
an increasingly uphill fight. This would become increasingly desperate as the Carter
Administration gradually hardened its stance towards Somoza. As Nicaragua’s
importance to the administration increased in 1978-1979 and top ranked officials got
involved, Wilson’s ability to support Somoza through direct legislation weakened.
Media coverage and scrutiny of Wilson and his support for Somoza intensified in
1978 when events in Nicaragua made the crisis a priority issue for the State Department
and eventually led Carter to become directly involved. The additional coverage of
Wilson’s actions on Somoza’s behalf led to heated exchanges between the congressional
officials and supporters of the human rights policy in the press.
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Chapter Two
January-September 1978: The Beginning of the End
The year 1978 represented a turning point in American policy towards Nicaragua
and the tactics employed by Wilson to maintain support for Somoza. The assassination of
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro unleashed a wave of social unrest within Nicaragua that by
August raised doubts about the stability of Somoza's regime. The Sandinistas capitalized
on the anger against Somoza to rally additional support and launch a renewed offensive
to topple the government. The lack of direct evidence linking Somoza to the murder
allowed both him and Wilson to avoid hard questions in America, although Somoza took
steps to further distance himself from blame.72 In January 1978, Wilson was focused on
trying to connect aid to Nicaragua with the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty. The
Treaty was Carter's primary foreign policy issue for Latin America. By attaching
continued aid to Somoza to this legislation, Wilson brought Carter directly into the
Nicaraguan question.
Wilson's threats against the treaty, along with the growing unrest temporarily,
changed U.S. policy towards Nicaragua from a human rights issue to a national and
regional security concern. Furthermore it made Nicaragua a priority for both the White
House and the State Department

72

LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 18-19, 593 n.28; Somoza, Nicaragua Betrayed, 111-116.

39

for the first time.73 It also changed Wilson's tactics from legislation to coercion; he
would attempt to threaten the administration into supporting Somoza. Chamorro's death,
coupled with Carter's refusal to intervene and force Somoza out, eventually unified the
opposition behind the Sandinistas, as the moderates lost influence.74 Wilson used the
unrest and lack of a moderate alternative to paint the issue of U.S. support for Somoza as
a stark choice between a pro-American dictator and a Communist government that would
follow if he fell.

Murder of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal
The mew year 1978, began with a scandal that threatened to undermine Wilson’s
entire campaign to protect support to Somoza. On January 10th three gunmen ambushed
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the outspoken critic of the regime and the publisher of
Nicaragua’s only opposition newspaper La Prensa. The attack happened in Managua in
broad daylight when Chamorro’s car was forced to the side of the road and he was shot
eighteen times. He died while en route to the hospital. Almost immediately his death was
blamed in some way on Somoza and the regime. Chamorro had been the most public
critic of the Somoza dynasty for decades, and he was also the recognized leader of the
moderate, nonviolent opposition to the regime.75 This position made Chamorro a viable

73

Lake, Somoza Falling, 1, 6-7.
LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 18-19.
75
Marlise Simons, "Nicaraguan Publisher, Critic of Somoza, Killed by Gunmen", Washington Post, January
11, 1978.
74

40

third option between Somoza and the Sandinistas. His opposition to the regime labeled
Somoza a prime suspect in his death, especially given the regime's clear motivation after
years of vocal opposition and his position as a viable moderate alternative.76 However,
Somoza had tolerated Chamorro for decades because his presence kept the opposition
divided. Chamorro's death became the moment that many observers would date as the
beginning of the end for the Somoza dynasty.77
Opposition to Somoza was divided between the Marxist-affiliated Sandinistas,
who advocated the violent overthrow of the regime, and the nonviolent opposition headed
by Chamorro.78 Chamorro led a coalition of opposition parties, some of them banned
from participating in elections. He also had close ties to the business sector and the labor
unions, providing him with a broad base of support.79 To the Sandinistas, Chamorro was
a product of the bourgeoisie and could not be trusted. His apparent support of capitalism
conflicted with their Marxist ideology. This mistrust was based on the financial success
of La Prensa which was the largest newspaper in Nicaragua.80 However, Somoza claimed
that Chamorro had ties to the Sandinistas and was directly involved in all of their
operations against his government. Regardless of Chamorro's connections to the
Sandinistas, prior to his death the Nicaraguan opposition to Somoza was not unified
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under a single organization.81 Attempts to create a united front were underway in the final
months of 1977, most notably with the creation of The Group of Twelve. The Group of
Twelve were opposition leaders from a cross section of Nicaraguan society. They
included members of the Catholic clergy, middle class businessmen, and various
professionals. The group met in Guatemala and released a communication which in part
praised the Sandinistas for their struggle against the Somoza government and called on
all opposition groups to put aside their differences and unite. However, prior to the
assassination of Chamorro these attempts to unify the opposition remained mostly
theoretical. As long as critics of the regime remained divided, Somoza's hold on power
was relatively safe. It meant that the Sandinistas lacked adequate support from the labor
and business sectors that would allow them to gain a foothold in the towns. This situation
isolated them in the countryside and preserved Somoza's hold on the economy.82
Chamorro's death changed this equation by providing a lightning rod to unite
opposition groups against the regime. Anger from the assassination reverberated
throughout Nicaraguan society and was directed towards Somoza whom many blamed
for the murder. It also provided the catalyst for turning the business sector from passive
resistance into active revolt against Somoza, weakening the regime's base of support. At
the same time Chamorro's death led Nicaragua's neighbors, especially Venezuela, to
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advocate for Somoza's resignation and eventually to support the Sandinistas against
him.83
Wilson never considered the possibility of replacing Somoza with Chamorro.
Arguably, this is due to the influence of the Somoza Lobby and the propaganda pushed
by the regime that linked Chamorro to the Sandinistas. However, there was no attempt by
the State Department to consider replacing Somoza prior to the summer of 1978. The
failure of both Wilson and the state Department to cultivate a third choice between
Somoza and the Sandinistas, led directly to the eventual Sandinista victory in 1979.
Anger against Somoza following Chamorro's death provided the Marxist-led group with
the support needed to truly threaten the regime. Without a leader to rally around, the
moderate opposition saw the Sandinistas as the only alternative to Somoza and began to
support their efforts. Wilson's actions in maintaining U,S. support to Somoza, rather than
finding a third option, contributed to the very outcome he sought to prevent.
Somoza recognized the potential danger to his relationship with the United States
in being blamed for the murder of Chamorro. His response to the crisis was to announce a
new package of reforms aimed at undermining support for the opposition and its potential
unification against him. Somoza did not respond to the crisis with a violent crackdown,
demonstrating an understanding that his government was under intense scrutiny.84 His
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security forces quickly arrested suspects who confessed during a televised trial, and he
put out a story that Chamorro was killed because of a business dispute.85 The anger
against Somoza did not disappear and continued to feed resistance to the regime
throughout 1978, but the lack of direct evidence linking the crime to Somoza allowed
both him and Wilson to avoid harsh questions from the American press. Somoza also
used interviews with American journalists to create doubt regarding his involvement. His
defense was that he could have had Chamorro killed many times when he was arrested,
but had never done so.86 Somoza personally acknowledged Chamorro's value in
maintaining the image of a free press in Nicaragua. Somoza described Chamorro as both
an enemy and an ally. His opposition and attacks on the regime through La Prensa made
him an enemy. At the same time allowing this opposition paper to continue to operate
created valuable evidence of a free press in Nicaragua, weakening claims that Somoza
was a dictator and making Chamorro an ally.87
In fact Chamorro's murder was not widely covered in the American media and
blew over quickly in the United States. In May when Wilson received extensive media
coverage for his support of Somoza,88 Chamorro was not mentioned. Wilson did lose a
valuable tool in his defense of Somoza. He had repeatedly pointed to Chamorro and his
newspaper as proof that Somoza was not a tyrannical dictator, because he allowed critics
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of the regime to spread their message in print.89 The murder was primarily important in
terms of Wilson's support of Somoza because of the unrest it caused in Nicaragua. This
instability made Somoza a greater priority to both the State Department and the White
House. It also changed Nicaragua from a human rights issue to a security concern once
the unrest morphed into an escalation of violence between the government and the
Sandinistas. The shift of Nicaragua from human rights to security concern led Wilson to
shift his tactics and paint support for Somoza not simply as a response to biased human
rights policy, but as necessary to prevent a Communist takeover.

Jan-May 1978: Wilson Threatens the Panama Canal Treaty and Secures Aid
The increasing instability in Nicaragua in 1978 demonstrated for Wilson the
necessity of continued U.S. support for Somoza. In an effort to pressure the State
Department to reverse course on the human rights agenda and restore American support
to the Nicaraguan government in the face of growing threats, Wilson took aim at Carter's
primary foreign policy plank for Latin America, the Panama Canal Treaty. The Somoza
Lobby in Congress, led by Wilson, attempted to trade votes for the Treaty ratification in
exchange for increased American support for Somoza.90 When it came time to ratify the
newly negotiated Treaty in Congress, Wilson saw it as an opportunity to press the
administration for concessions to Somoza, a clear example of Wilson having his own
agenda apart from that laid out by his party. He supported Carter's right to shape foreign
89
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policy up until it conflicted with his own desire to protect America's traditional allies in
the fight against Communism. The Canal Treaty represented another opportunity to pick
a fight with the White House and its shift towards human rights.91
The unique nature of the Panama Canal Treaty offered Wilson and his allies the
ability to threaten its survival in Congress. Under the United States Constitution, treaties
have to be ratified by the Senate, but because the Canal was U.S. territory any handover
to Panama had to be approved by the full Congress. This provided Wilson with the ability
to threaten the legislation in the House of Representatives.92 The Panama Canal had been
a vital strategic asset for the United States for decades since it was constructed in 1914.
The United States maintained control over both the Canal itself and a strip of adjacent
territory along both sides referred to as the Canal Zone. Arguably no region had a rockier
relationship with the United States than Latin America. Decades of hegemonic
domination had witnessed numerous American military intervention and occupations,
including Nicaragua. However, by the time President Carter was elected in 1977 the
Canal had lost most of its value to the United States. It was no longer able to
accommodate the largest cargo ships or American aircraft carriers. At the same time the
presence of a permanent U.S. military occupation in Panama created a diplomatic
sticking point between the State Department and the region. The Carter Administration
sought to improve its relations with Panama and with Latin America in general by
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negotiating a Treaty that would hand both the Canal and Canal Zone over to the
Panamanian government. Such diplomacy would undermine claims of continued
American imperialism, used by revolutionaries to stoke anti-American sentiment. The
Panama Canal Treaty represented Carter’s attempt to push the reset button on U.S.
relations with Latin America.93
The Canal Treaty was a very publicly debated piece of foreign policy for the
Carter Administration which Wilson saw as a useful asset to assist Somoza's regime. The
idea that the United States would willingly give away the Canal which it had paid for and
built divided public opinion in America, evident in Wilson having received several antiTreaty letters from his constituents.94 The Canal had been presented as a strategic asset
since it was constructed, and this image didn’t fade from the public imagination
overnight. Most importantly the Panama Canal was seen both as a prestige project and a
symbol of the national strength of the United States. It was a physical projection of
American power into Latin America, and here was an American president offering to
hand it over to the government of Panama. The Treaty divided opinion both in the
American public and within the halls of Congress.95 These debates and divisions
provided an opportunity for Wilson to use the Treaty as leverage in his struggle to aid
Somoza.
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Originally, Wilson acknowledged that the Canal no longer held vital strategic
interests for the United States and had publicly supported Carter's position in 1977.
Despite the anti-Treaty letters he had received, most of which he believed were from
“rigidly conservative organizations,” Wilson initially supported handing over the Canal.
He had even voted in favor of the Canal Treaty in the House of Representatives and also
expressed his acceptance of the Executive Branch’s prerogative in shaping foreign
policy.96 Despite his support for the Treaty, which would not change until 1979, Wilson
saw threatening it as a useful tool for gaining additional support for Nicaragua.97 The
debates surrounding the Treaty meant that the vote for ratification would be tight and the
administration could ill afford any loss of support. The White House's need for every vote
gave power to the Somoza Lobby's efforts to trade votes for the Treaty in exchange for
aid to Somoza.98
Wilson's primary demand was the restoration of millions of dollars in aid that had
been held up by the State Department for human rights violations. He threatened that if
the administration did not reverse course and restore the aid to Nicaragua then he would
torpedo the entire Foreign Aid bill for 1978. This would include aid to Panama and
potentially threaten the Panama Canal Treaty.99 Wilson's attack hinged on his threat to
introduce legislation in Congress that would restrict American aid to any country with a
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similar rating for human rights as Nicaragua. The restrictions on aid in this legislation
would have included Panama, along with several countries in Africa and the Middle East.
Such legislation, if passed, would have tied a relatively minor foreign policy concern in
Nicaragua to policy with global implications. The countries that would have been
affected by this legislation included several with vital strategic value to the United States,
such as oil-rich nations like Iran or Egypt with its control of the Suez Canal. On the
surface this legislation appeared to address the double standard in the application of
human rights in foreign policy Wilson repeatedly complained about by establishing an
equal rating system for all countries receiving U.S. aid.100 For the State Department and
the White House, though, Nicaragua simply was not worth the level of trouble this Texan
congressman was threatening to unleash on their foreign policy agenda. However the
Carter Administration also had to demonstrate its commitment to human rights, and so it
attempted to find a middle ground that would appease both sides.
The White House reduced the military aid request for Nicaragua to $150,000 in
the budget for 1979 in an effort to appease the human rights faction. This reduction was
an effort to demonstrate continued displeasure with Somoza's human rights record.
Furthermore it was intended to show that the administration would follow through on its
human rights rhetoric. The administration's policy followed the same pattern it had
employed in September of 1977 when it had withheld some aid for domestic political
reasons. Wilson and the Somoza Lobby did not fight this reduction in military aid and
100
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made no attempt to restore it to normal levels. They understood that they had already
spent considerable political capital in their efforts to maintain support for Somoza
throughout 1977.101 They simply could not muster that level of effort for every single
policy clash with the White House and State Department, illustrating Wilson's political
savviness and his understanding that he had to pick his battles.
Wilson and the Somoza Lobby were further rewarded for their efforts in using the
Panama Treaty and threatening the entire foreign aid bill in May of 1978. In an effort to
avoid the potential consequences Wilson threatened to unleash in Congress, the State
Department gave in. Millions of dollars in economic aid, which had been withheld
because of human rights, were released to Nicaragua. This aid was comprised of
economic loans that had been approved in 1977 but were stalled in the pipeline to
pressure Somoza to improve his record. The State Department was quick to reassure the
human rights camp that this did not represent a shift in policy, and in the long run it did
not. However, at the time Nicaragua was simply not worth the trouble of risking the
administration's entire foreign aid program. The media widely singled out Wilson as the
architect for the release of funds to the Somoza regime.102 He became the recognized
leader of the Somoza Lobby in Congress, and that recognition brought increased attacks
by both supporters of the human rights policy and the moderate Nicaraguan opposition.
Wilson's success in leveraging Carter's desire for the Panama Canal Treaty into additional
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aid for Somoza made him an obstacle to those who desired changes in U.S. policy
towards Somoza. The attacks to which he was subjected were an attempt to remove his
ability to keep aid flowing to the Nicaraguan regime.

May 1978: Attacks from Human Rights Group and the Nicaraguan
Moderates
Wilson’s success in using the Panama Canal to secure aid for Nicaragua, coupled
with his victories in 1977, brought him to the attention of not just the American media
but many in Nicaragua. His ability to repeatedly force the State Department to water
down its human rights policy towards Nicaragua placed him against human rights groups
in America. Wilson’s victories in restoring aid, withheld for human rights abuses, in
Congress made him the apparent obstacle to the success of the human rights agenda.
Consequently, his status as the recognized leader of the Somoza Lobby led human rights
groups to attack his credibility and motives. At the same time, members of the moderate
opposition to Somoza in Nicaragua attacked Wilson for preventing a peaceful transition
to democracy by maintaining American support for Somoza.
The most vocal of these critics was Larry Birns, the director of the Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, a liberal non-profit organization that campaigned in support of
human rights policies. Birns claimed that Wilson's support for Somoza was driven in part
by personal financial gain. Prior to arriving in Congress Wilson had worked for the
Temple-Eastex Lumber Company based in his home district and still owned around a
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hundred thousand dollars in company stock. Birns and his supporters used the idea that a
desire to protect his own financial interests motivated Wilson's support of Somoza as
evidence to attack his credibility. Following Wilson's success in gaining aid for
Nicaragua, Birns began demanding that he release additional financial documents to
prove if he had financial interests in Nicaragua.103 These attacks had begun in September
1977, but intensified as Wilson became the public face of the Somoza Lobby in
Congress.104
There was no evidence that personal gain tied to his stock in the company
motivated Wilson to support Somoza. Eastex-Temple reportedly imported one and a half
million “rough dowels” from Nicaragua for use in making mop and broom handles,
although the company denied importing wood from Nicaragua. The company
manufactured ten to twelve percent of all mops and broom handles sold in the United
States every year during the late 1970s.105 Furthermore the Commerce Department did
not list Temple-Eastex or its parent company, Time Inc., as American firms doing
business in Nicaragua.106 Wilson even claimed that he knew virtually nothing about
Nicaragua prior to being approached by Fred Korth and recruited to the Somoza
Lobby.107 If Nicaragua represented a vital financial interest for him then he should have
had knowledge of the country prior to his work with the lobby. Wilson responded to these
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attacks when they began in 1977 by saying, "Every time you lefties lose a big vote, you
think it’s gotta be the forces of darkness. You think, ‘shit, that son of a bitch musta done
something. Let’s find out what.’”108 Such colorful language illustrated Wilson’s view that
the allegations of personal gain motivated his support for Somoza were angry attempts at
revenge by the left because he had thwarted its agenda.
Ultimately, Wilson’s involvement in Nicaragua centered on his anti-Communist
beliefs and not from personal financial gain. Despite claims of financial motivations for,
Wilson’s anti-Communist beliefs extended well beyond Nicaragua and were not tied to
his personal finances. He had become involved in Nicaragua to challenge what he felt
was Carter’s weakening stance against Communist expansion. Wilson believed that
withdrawal of support from traditional anti-Communist allies, such as Somoza,
encouraged the spread of Communism and endangered American security.109 Nicaragua
simply became the place, through the efforts of Korth, where he chose to take a stand
against this policy. Opposition to any Communist expansion and preserving longstanding
U.S. allies were both seen by Wilson as vital to national security.110 Furthermore,
Wilson’s opposition to the expansion of Communism predated his efforts on behalf of
Somoza and continued after Somoza fell. However, the attacks were seen as a serious
enough threat to his credibility that Wilson felt it was necessary to publicly address them.
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Wilson challenged these accusations by going on the offensive seeking to prove
the Communist links of his opponents. When Birns demanded that Wilson should provide
his tax records to the media for examination to prove he had nothing to hide, Wilson
responded by stating that as a member of Congress he had already provided this
information to the records office, as all members of Congress are required to do. Wilson
counterattacked by demanding that Birns and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs should
reveal the names and identities of its donors.111 To Cold Warriors like Wilson, anyone
who supported Communist-linked groups equaled Communists or at least Communist
sympathizers. Getting access to the names of the Council’s contributors would provide a
useful method of revealing these links. If any donors could be linked to Communist
groups the credibility of the entire organization could be undermined, removing it from
the human rights debate. Birns argued that his organization's financial statements were
already a matter of public record because it was a nonprofit. The two men would continue
to spar over the Nicaragua question, as they had since 1977. Wilson repeatedly stated his
belief that Birns received money from Cuba or other Communist sources.112 This was
another attempt to label a critic as a Communist to destroy their credibility. Birn's
personal attacks on Wilson, illustrated Wilson's recognized importance in the Somoza
Lobby. The two men would continue to butt heads over Nicaragua, but as violence
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increased after August the human rights question became less important as would Birn’s
criticism.
U.S.-based human rights groups were not the only organizations to take notice of
Wilson after his success in May 1978. Members of the moderate Nicaraguan opposition
to Somoza also took offense at his support for the regime. On May 22, 1978, Wilson
received a telegram from the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (M.D.N.), which
condemned his continued lobbying for U.S. aid to Somoza.113 Since the death of
Chamorro the moderates had lacked a clear leader and were held together only by their
opposition to the regime. They waited for the United States to remove Somoza, either
directly or through the National Guard. The rhetoric of human rights put forward by
Carter and the State Department had encouraged them in the belief that Somoza no longer
had America’s backing. The moderates also believed that they shared a common goal
with America in preventing a Sandinista victory.114 In their eyes Wilson’s ability to
restore U.S. aid to Somoza reinforced the regime’s hold on power. They accused him of
undermining their opportunity to bring about meaningful change in Nicaragua by
transitioning the country from dictatorship to democracy. The moderates recognized that
it was U.S. aid that kept Somoza in power. The M.D.N. also claimed that its efforts were
supported by the majority of Nicaragua’s people who wanted to be rid of Somoza.115
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Their direct attacks against Wilson demonstrated that his position as the leading voice of
support for Somoza in Congress was recognized by groups based in Nicaragua.
Throughout his support for Somoza Wilson never considered moderate
alternatives to the regime. His refusal to consider a third option between Somoza and the
Sandinistas is possible evidence of the influence the Somoza Lobby had on him. The
amount of pro-Somoza propaganda in his papers provides evidence that they did have an
impact on his views of the situation in Nicaragua. He comes to share their bleak
projections for the counrty if Somoza was allowed to fall. In Wilson's opinion the only
group that would have benefited from Somoza’s removal from power were the
Communists. His attacks on critics of the regime, including witnesses in Congressional
hearings and human rights advocates, centered on linking them to Communist groups.116
This was a way to destroy their credibility and limit their threat to Somoza. Wilson
believed that the “democratic” opposition to Somoza should prepare for the elections
scheduled for 1981 rather than trying to sneak into power by undermining Somoza. He
stated his support for the 1981 elections and emphasized the fact that under the
Nicaraguan Constitution Somoza could not run again. Furthermore, Wilson was quick to
point out that Somoza had declared that he would hand over power to whoever won the
election.117 His statement reflected the belief that there was no need to force Somoza out
of power and doing so would have only aided the Communists. The administration
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should support the regime until the elections slated for 1981 were held and then allow
these elections to bring about a peaceful political solution to the Nicaraguan crisis. His
support for elections ignored the fact that the regime had never allowed a truly free and
fair election to be held before. All previous elections had been rigged in favor of the
Somoza dynasty and only held to provide the illusion of democracy to appease the U.S.

Mixed Signals and a Covert Operation: Carter’s Letter to Somoza and
Wilson’s Failed Attempt at Intervention
The moderate opposition suffered a shock in August 1978, when a letter sent by
President Carter to Somoza was leaked to the press.118 After waiting for America to force
Somoza out of power, they were confronted with apparent evidence that the regime still
enjoyed U.S. support. The ramifications of this letter profoundly shifted the situation on
the ground in Nicaragua by uniting neighboring countries with the Sandinistas against the
regime. It also further weakened the moderates and their ability to present a viable
alternative between the Somoza regime and the Sandinistas.
Somoza understood that the foundation for his power rested on maintaining
American support for his regime. This support had been vital for both his father and older
brother in establishing and preserving the family dynasty. Realizing that the rhetoric of
the State Department was moving away from reform and towards his removal from
office, Somoza made public efforts to address Carter's demands for improvements on
118
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human rights. On June 19, 1978, he announced a package of reforms aimed at placating
his critics in the White House and State Department. These reforms included pardons for
several prisoners and allowing a number of opposition leaders to return home. Promises
to introduce election reforms were also included in this package. Somoza even invited the
Organization of American States Human Rights Commission to visit Nicaragua. If this
commission investigated the claims of human rights abuses in Nicaragua it could provide
Somoza with possible vindication from abuse claims. At the same time, even if the
commission did not clear his government, it could still be used to highlight the abuses
committed by the Sandinistas. Somoza’s plan was to delay and attempt to hold out until
1981.119 Appeasing U.S. concerns on human rights played into that strategy by
preventing the complete withdrawal of American support. In turn this support kept the
opposition divided and allowed Somoza to maintain his grip on power.
These promises to introduce reforms and improve human rights conditions reaped
tangible benefits for Somoza. In an effort to encourage the dictator to carry through on
his pledges for reform, Carter sent a personal letter to Somoza. This letter was meant to
remain private, but Somoza had other ideas.120 At the same time, Carter's apparent
support for Somoza brought condemnation both in the U.S. and Nicaragua.
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Carter’s Letter to Somoza: Mixed Signals and Political Divisions
One apparent benefit Somoza gained from the declaration of reforms came from
President Carter. On June 30, 1978, Carter sent a signed letter praising Somoza for his
public promises of reforms for Nicaragua. Carter especially acknowledged how these
changes would demonstrate a respect for human rights and represented a significant step
on Somoza’s part in addressing State Department criticism of his regime. The president
also pointed out how the Inter-American Human Rights Commission would look
favorably upon Somoza’s declaration that members of the Group of Twelve would be
allowed to return to Nicaragua. The letter was meant to encourage Somoza to follow
through on his pledges of reforms. Despite Carter's good intentions, the letter became a
foreign policy blunder with far reaching consequences. The damage caused to the foreign
policy agenda was partially the result of divisions between officials in the State
Department and White House which resulted in concerns over the letter not reaching
Carter before he chose to send it.
The letter was conveyed to Somoza in secret because the State Department was
concerned that if this statement of support from the American President was made public
it would embolden him. Individuals within the State Department, including Robert Pastor
and Anthony Lake, both involved in shaping foreign policy at the time, expressed their
concerns about the letter being sent. Pastor's concerns centered around Somoza's history
of failing to follow through on promises to bring about meaningful reforms and that he
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would use the letter to serve his own agenda.121 Lake also held concerns about the letter,
but saw it as a minor issue at the time. He chose not to challenge the decision to send it to
Somoza because he did not want to expend political capital he needed elsewhere. At the
time Lake was challenging policy dealing with Cuban activities in Ethiopia. These and
other concerns about the impact of the letter, expressed by administration officials, were
not relayed to Carter before he decided to send it, because his National Security Advisor,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, did not send them to him. These differing opinions reflected the
foreign policy divisions within the Carter Administration between people like Pastor who
supported the human rights policy and officials like Brzezinski who viewed the Cold War
through the eyes of how policy would affect U.S.-Soviet relations.122
The divisions between officials like Brzezinski, who saw foreign policy through
the lens of U.S.-Soviet relation, and those like Pastor or Secretary of State Cyrus Vance,
who favored the human rights approach, had not impacted policy towards Nicaragua
before 1978. Throughout 1977, Nicaragua had not been an issue for top level officials in
either the State Department or the White House. They had been, and remained, primarily
focused on the wider geopolitical issues of detente with the Soviets or the Camp David
Accords. Nicaragua was never the top priority for the Carter Administration throughout
its time in power. it became an issue in 1978 largely as a result of both Wilson's attacks
on the Panama Canal Treaty and the unrest following Chamorro's death. It is only after
these events brought the questions surrounding support of Somoza off the back burner
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that the internal divisions between Brzezinski and Vance began to influence U.S. policy.
Wilson had succeeded in bringing high level officials into the Nicaragua policy debate,
but achieving this goal actually damaged his ability to keep aid flowing to Somoza in the
long term.
The human rights bureau had opposed sending the letter in the first place because
they felt it could undermine the credibility of the human rights policy. When the letter
was leaked to the Washington Post on August 1, 1978, these fears were amplified.123 The
Carter Administration appeared once again to be flip-flopping because it condemned the
human rights situation in Nicaragua then appeared to offer its support to the Somoza
regime. At the heart of the State Department’s concerns was the timing of the letter. It
was believed that a letter of support from Carter might jeopardize Somoza's willingness
to allow the Inter-American Human Rights Commission into Nicaragua. He had invited
them to cultivate U.S. support, but if he received proof of Carter’s support beforehand he
would have less incentive to cooperate.124
The letter could also have a divisive effect in Congress, where the foreign aid bill
for 1979 was being debated. Liberals could attack support to Nicaragua in an effort to
push back against the letter. Wilson and fellow supporters of Somoza had already
threatened to retaliate with cuts in aid to countries with similar rights records. This clash
could derail the entire foreign aid bill. Once again it appeared that the Administration
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lacked a clear vision for what it hoped to gain through its human rights-based foreign
policy in Nicaragua.125
Fears that Somoza would use the letter for his own benefit were well founded. If
the letter remained private as Carter had intended, it was of little value to him. Somoza
hoped to use this tangible sign of U.S. support to strengthen his position with his
neighbors. He later said of the letter, that he "was not interested in a collector's item and,
without being able to use the letter publicly, that's what it was."126 Somoza arranged a
meeting with Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez, and at this meeting he bragged
about the letter he had received from the American president. He hoped the evidence of
support from the United States would pressure Perez, who had become an outspoken
critic of the regime and called for Somoza to resign, into changing his tune. His plan
failed and Perez continued to demand that Somoza resign. Somoza rejected this demand,
claiming that he had to remain in power to prevent a Communist takeover.127
The public disclosure of the letter failed to serve Somoza's intended purpose, but
it did bring Nicaragua fully to Carter's attention. The leak coupled with a renewed
offensive by the Sandinistas changed how the administration would view Nicaragua.
Policy towards Somoza would no longer be defined solely on the basis of human rights.
Instead Nicaragua became a clear political and security concern, and U.S. policy towards
Somoza fell into the hands of the National Security Council rather than the State
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Department.128 This shift would be reflected in how Wilson and the Somoza Lobby
framed their argument for U.S. support for Somoza.
The fact that the letter was intended to remain secret meant that it was not the
public show of support for Somoza that Wilson sought to achieve. Furthermore the letter,
despite how it was interpreted, did not indicate a change in U.S. policy towards Somoza.
The Carter Administration remained committed to distancing itself from the Nicaraguan
regime and pressuring Somoza to make concrete reforms to his government. The refusal
of the White House or State Department to change the policy towards Nicaragua
frustrated Wilson. According to Noel Holmes, Wilson's personal assistant during his
support for Somoza, this frustration went beyond a clash over policy to a personal need
by Wilson to be recognized on foreign policy issues. By refusing to cut a deal with him,
the State Department was indicating that he was not a “player” and robbed him of that
recognition.129 Wilson's desire to be acknowledged for his efforts raises questions of his
ego and how a desire for personal glory influenced his decisions. Another possibility is
that hos percieved power in Congress came from his ability to force opponents to
compromise with him. If Wilson gained public proof that he had pressured both the state
Department and White House to make a deal with him, and change their stated policy
goals towards Somoza, his position in Congress would be enhanced significantly. His
growing frustration with the administration's lack of flexibility led Wilson to take his first
steps into covert operations.
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Charlie's First Attempt at a Covert Operation: Ed Wilson and a Plan to Save
Somoza
Wilson was convinced that withdrawal of American support for Somoza would
encourage a Communist takeover. As a traditional anti-Communist, preventing the rise of
additional Communist states, especially in the Americas, was a core tenet of his views on
foreign policy. The presence of an active Marxist insurgency, the Sandinistas, in
Nicaragua with ties to Cuba reinforced the need for the Carter Administration to stand by
its ally Somoza. For Wilson the only people who would benefit from a collapse of the
Somoza regime would be the Communists.130 Under these conditions preserving the
regime became a matter of American and regional security to Cold Warriors like Wilson.
Frustration over his inability to change State Department and White House policy
towards Nicaragua, even after threatening the Panama Canal Treaty, led directly to
Wilson’s first attempt at a covert operation. In his desperation to preserve Somoza he
became involved in a plot that would not have looked out of place in John Foster Dulles’s
playbook of the 1950s.
Wilson's failed attempts to use the Panama Canal Treaty to force a true change in
policy towards U.S. support of Somoza appeared to be his final card to play. His options
seemed limited to maintaining a certain level of American financial support. However,
that changed when he was introduced to a renegade ex-C.I.A. agent named Ed Wilson.
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Charlie Wilson appears to have believed throughout their dealings that Ed was still an
active member of the C.I.A., possibly in a deep cover role. Ed Wilson fit the image of
what Charlie, who had never met an actual spy before, thought of an agent in the Central
Intelligence Agency. Ed was taller than Wilson at well over six feet and weighed around
250 pounds, and was “just a very lethal looking person”. Charlie claimed that, “Ed had
convinced me that he had personally killed Che Guevara and I thought, Shit, if he got
Che, he can sure get that little turd Ortega,” a reference to the leader of the Sandinistas.
Meeting this rogue former C.I.A. operative gave Wilson an idea for how to counter the
unwillingness of the Carter Administration to confront the Communist threat in
Nicaragua. The two Wilsons concocted a plan for how they would come to the rescue of
the Somoza regime, even if the American government was unwilling to take the
necessary action to protect U.S. national security.131
In the summer of 1978, Charlie arranged a meeting for himself and Ed Wilson
with Somoza. The meeting took place at Somoza’s favorite American retreat, the Palm
Bay Club in Miami, Florida. At this meeting Ed laid out his plan to recruit one thousand
former members of the C.I.A. who would be paid to assist Somoza in his struggle with
the Sandinistas. At first Somoza was thrilled with the idea of his own private army of
assassins who could eliminate his enemies. As the three men continued to get drunk
Wilson claimed that they got “more exited, killing Ortega, killing everybody”. This plot
had all the hallmarks of an old school Cold War intervention, using mercenaries to
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covertly achieve an objective when domestic political concerns prevented direct
involvement. This plot represented Wilson’s first attempt at covert operations in foreign
policy and suited his desire to kill Communists wherever possible. It checked all of
Wilson’s boxes because it provided a possible means to preserve Somoza as an American
ally and presented an opportunity to directly confront and kill Communists without
putting himself in direct danger.132
The plan and the meeting fell apart for two reasons. The first occurred when
Somoza began to dance and flirt with Wilson’s date for the evening. Somoza's flirting
resulted in his mistress, who had accompanied him to the meeting, beginning to berate
the dictator in Spanish followed by removing his glasses and stepping on them. This
display was a public embarrassment for Somoza. At the same time the dictator's flirting
with Wilson’s date resulted in destroying any personal affection that Wilson might have
previously held for Somoza, although Wilson continued to support him. The second and
most important reason for the plan falling apart was the fact that Somoza refused to
provide the necessary funds to carry it out. Ed Wilson claimed that it would only cost
around $100 million dollars to fund this private army of former operatives, roughly $100
thousand per person recruited. Somoza balked at the price tag, claiming that it was just
too expensive. Given both his own personal fortune and that of his family $100 million
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dollars would appear to be a small price to pay, especially if it had the potential of
eliminating a potent threat to his regime.133
Although this plan to recruit former spies to aid Somoza failed, it demonstrated
the lengths to which Wilson was willing to go to oppose Communism. His zeal to oppose
Communism led Wilson to interact with shady characters like Ed Wilson. Ed would be
arrested in 1983 for selling arms to Libya in violation of U.S. sanctions and sentenced to
fifty-two years in federal prison.134 This episode also represented a landmark moment for
Wilson because it was his first direct involvement in covert operations and with the
C.I.A., even if it was through a renegade former agent. Despite the failure of his plan it
illustrated the possibility for using covert operations to bypass the official channels of
government legislation when these were opposed to his own views. This willingness to
resort to a covert war against Communist aggression would later come to fruition in the
mountains of Afghanistan during the 1980s. Wilson’s decision to attempt the recruitment
of mercenaries to support Somoza, demonstrated how desperate he had become to
preserve Somoza in the face of the Carter Administration's refusal to reverse course.
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Chapter 3
August '78- July '79: Wilson’s Desperate Last Stand to Save Somoza
By August and September 1978 the situation in Nicaragua had reached the level
of a crisis and brought the questions surrounding Somoza fully to Carter’s attention.
Carter’s active involvement, although desired by Wilson, would in fact limit his ability to
influence policy towards Nicaragua, especially after a meeting between fellow Somoza
Lobby advocate Rep. John Murphy and Carter in January 1979. Control over U.S.Nicaragua policy moved from the State Department to the National Security Council. As
the anger that had simmered since Chamorro’s death exploded into sporadic waves of
violence in Nicaragua throughout the final months of 1978, American officials
increasingly saw Somoza as the problem. The White House and State Department
organized and supported attempts to mediate the crisis in the hope of preventing a
Sandinista victory and the spread of the revolution to other nations in the region. In
contrast, Wilson, Somoza, and their allies stoked fears of a Communist government
following the regime if it was allowed to fall. They also began complaining of a
conspiracy involving Panama, Costa Rica, and Venezuela allied with the Sandinistas
against Somoza. The uncertainty surrounding Somoza's future, placed Carter’s foreign
policy in limbo. This uncertainty allowed Wilson to prevent the complete withdrawal of
American support during the spring of 1979, even after any chance of changing Carter’s
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policy faded. As the end of the Somoza dynasty neared he lashed out at the
administration’s policy which he viewed as a betrayal of an American ally.

August-September 78: Renewed Violence and the Shift from Human Rights
to National Security
On August 22, 1978, a group of twenty-six Sandinistas led by Eden Pastora seized
control of the Nicaraguan National Palace. They took 1,500 hostages and held the
building for two days. Somoza decided not to storm the palace and instead negotiated
with the Sandinistas. He agreed to pay half a million dollars in ransom, although Pastora
had wanted $10 million, and allow a revolutionary call to arms to be played for the next
two days. Pastora and the rest of the rebels were then given safe passage to the airport
and allowed to fly to Panama, where crowds gathered to greet them. Pastora and the
Sandinistas, to the chagrin of Somoza, had even used the letter from Carter to justify their
attack on the palace. However, this was simply a means of garnering support, and in
reality the attack was motivated by fears that the National Guard would replace Somoza.
The U.S. replacing Somoza would have weakened the anti-Somoza sentiment that was
fueling support for the Sandinistas among the Nicaraguan public.135
The growing instability in Nicaragua changed how the Carter Administration
viewed the question of aid to Somoza. Fears that the violence could spread to
neighboring countries, especially Panama, and destabilize the region alarmed the White
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House. This led to a shift in U.S.-Nicaraguan policy from it being defined as a human
rights issue to a security concern. By this point control over policy rested with the
National Security Council inside the White House and no longer with the State
Department.136
The new wave of violence demonstrated to Wilson the need for the administration
to publicly support Somoza. In an effort to pressure Carter to come to the aid of the
Nicaraguan government, Wilson joined with fifty-nine other members of Congress in
signing a letter to the president. This letter, sent on September 22, 1978, stressed the ties
between the Sandinistas and Cuba. In it Wilson and his allies declared that clear evidence
existed that showed the goal of the revolution was to transform Nicaragua into a second
Cuba. The bipartisan group of Congressmen called upon Carter to publicly show his
support for Somoza. They blamed the willingness of certain parts of Nicaraguan society,
including portions of the business sector, to support the Sandinistas on a lack of action by
both the State Department and White House. Furthermore, they claimed that growing
American hostility towards Somoza had driven support to the Communists.137
The renewed wave of violence in Nicaragua, led by the Marxist-linked
Sandinistas, changed how Wilson framed his argument for support to Somoza. The risk
of a Communist takeover replaced the attacks on any double standards or human rights
bias as his primary means for gaining support.138 The active conflict in Nicaragua and the
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waves of violence, from August 1978 until Somoza's fall in July of 1979, provided him
with supporting evidence for the polarized picture he painted. This image was between
Somoza, who despite his flaws was a proven ally of the United States, and the specter of
a second Cuba rising in his place.139 Regardless of the shifts in both the situation on the
ground in Nicaragua and the direction of his attacks, Wilson's ability to effect real change
remained limited. He could continue to pressure the administration for limited
concessions to Somoza, but he was unable to force Carter to fundamentally change his
core foreign policy goals.
Despite the presence of an active revolution with clear links to Communist
countries, calls by Wilson and other members of Congress for increased support to
Nicaragua fell on deaf ears. This was because the core principle of Carter's foreign policy
was non-intervention. Carter was attempting to step back from the imperialist image that
had previously dominated U.S. policy towards Latin America, with military interventions
and coups. In regards to Somoza, the administration had attempted to straddle the fence
in an effort to maintain support from both the conservative and liberal wings of the
Democratic Party. It refused to openly embrace him as previous presidents had done. At
the same time the White House would not try to actively remove Somoza from power. In
the end this middle ground approach pleased no one.140 Liberal Democrats condemned it
for not going far enough and called for the end of all U.S. support. On the other hand,
hawkish, conservative, Cold Warriors like Wilson viewed the refusal to embrace Somoza
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as a betrayal of an established ally. Further complicating the equation, a large portion of
the Nicaraguan people was actively trying to remove Somoza from power. They were not
waiting any longer for the Carter Administration to make up its mind.141

Attempts to Mediate the Crisis and Wilson’s Response
Responding to the growing violence and unrest in Nicaragua, the State
Department and White House attempted to create a mediation process to end the conflict.
The first venture would last from September 1978 until Somoza killed it in January of
1979. Carter insisted that the State Department seek support for the mediation from Latin
America to ensure that it did not appear that the United States was acting unilaterally.
Acting through the Organization of American States, the State Department established a
mediation process. Representatives from the OAS, the Somoza government, and the
Sandinistas met to discuss ending the conflict. Somoza's representatives demanded that
he be allowed to finish his constitutionally mandated term, which ended in 1981. The
Sandinistas demanded that Somoza resign immediately, while the OAS suggested that
Somoza hand over power to a junta comprised of members of Somoza's party and the
National Guard. The process broke down when Somoza refused to resign and the
Sandinistas walked away from the mediation after it became clear that they would have
no place in the new power structure.142
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The closest the mediation came to success was when Somoza proposed a
plebiscite to resolve the conflict. He stated that if he won he would serve out the
remainder of his term and if he lost then he would resign. Wilson held the offer of a
plebiscite up as proof that Somoza was not the brutal dictator his rivals painted him as.
He went on to speculate that President Carter probably wouldn’t have made a similar
offer. Wilson also attacked what he saw as the administration's attempts to claim credit
for the mediation, giving all the credit instead to Somoza.143 The plebiscite offer nearly
succeeded because the moderates feared a Sandinista victory as much as the continuation
of the Somoza dynasty. Fear of the Sandinistas led them to consider accepting the
proposal, but it fell apart when Somoza refused to accept State Department demands for
international oversight of the elections. The State Department was convinced that
Somoza’s offer was simply a delaying tactic and knew that the regime would never allow
free and fair elections to be held. By February 1979 the mediation broke down when
Somoza refused to allow all Nicaraguans to take part in the plebiscite and several
opposition groups withdrew from the process.144
Somoza’s refusal to allow a free and fair vote for the proposed plebiscite led the
Carter Administration to impose sanctions on the regime. These were designed to
pressure Somoza to return to the failed mediation process. However, Wilson was able to
ensure that these sanctions were directed only at military and political support, most of
which had been gutted already. The N.S.C. intended the sanctions to be mostly symbolic
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and did not want to expend all its leverage with Somoza at once.145 Once again Wilson
was able to pressure the administration to weaken its policy towards Somoza, but he
lacked the ability to force a change in direction.
Wilson never considered a moderate alternative to Somoza. In his view the only
group that stood to gain from Somoza’s removal was the Communists. Thus, he spun the
mediation process to paint Somoza in the best possible light. The key to this effort was
Somoza’s offer of a plebiscite, which Wilson claimed surprised him. He also attacked the
opposition for believing that the U.S. would put them in power, claiming that they had
failed to demonstrate popular support or military strength. In Wilson’s view, Somoza’s
fall would create a vacuum that would inevitably be filled by the Sandinistas.146 To him
the choice was clear. If the United States failed to support Somoza it would lead to
another Cuba rising in Central America.
The evidence appears to support the possibility that prior to Chamorro's death,
and even until the Carter letter was sent, that Somoza could have been replaced with a
moderate alternative. Wilson never acknowledged this possibility and always maintained
that the choice facing the U.S. was supporting Somoza, or accepting a Communist victory
in Nicaragua. There was a window during which the Sandinistas could have been
thwarted if a viable candidate had received sufficient American support. However, like in
Cuba with Fulgencio Batista, the U.S. failed to groom an alternative leader and paved the
way for a Communist revolution to seize power. Wilson's actions through pressuring the
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Carter Administration to continue its support of Somoza, aided the Sandinista victory he
fought to prevent.
The lack of a viable third option between Somoza and the Sandinistas during the
mediations played into Somoza's hands. It allowed him to once again stress the choice as
being between him and Communism.147 Without a moderate option with a broad base of
support, the administration was handcuffed. As previously stated, Carter's policy was
non-interference which meant that the White House was not willing to forcibly remove
him from power. The death of Chamorro had eliminated the only viable alternative to
Somoza. Without a moderate choice who could pry public support away from the
Sandinistas, the mediation process was doomed to fail from the start. The coalition of
groups that formed the revolution against Somoza was held together by their hatred of
Somoza and his regime. They did not have a unifying ideology; the Sandinistas with their
Marxist views were only the most visible group. The only thing holding the opposition
together was their shared hatred of Somoza.148
The collapse of the diplomatic effort to mediate the crisis led many moderate
groups to reluctantly rally behind the Sandinistas as the only means of removing Somoza.
The Sandinistas new, reluctant, allies included neighboring countries such as Panama,
Costa Rica, and Venezuela which began providing support for the Sandinistas in the fall
of 1978. This support increased following the collapse of the mediation when it became
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clear that only force would remove Somoza. For Wilson and Somoza these nations
supporting the Sandinistas represented a conspiracy against the Nicaraguan regime.149

OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission Report and the Growing
Conspiracy against Somoza
Wilson's claims of a double standard being used against Somoza were supported
in October 1978 when the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission arrived in
Nicaragua at Somoza’s invitation. The commission remained in Nicaragua for nine days
to investigate the human rights situation in the country. However, if Somoza had thought
the visit would aid his position these hopes were soon destroyed. The investigation had
focused exclusively on abuse claims against the government and had ignored all evidence
regarding abuses committed by the Sandinistas. The report issued by the commission
following its investigation was one-sided and did not contain any remarks or comments
from the Nicaraguan government. These had all been excluded from the report by the
commission. The one-sided nature of the investigation simply provided more evidence
that Nicaragua and Somoza were being singled out for punishment on the basis of alleged
human rights abuses. The removal of any counter-argument from the Nicaraguan
government from the report denied Somoza the opportunity to defend himself. For
Wilson it also undermined the credibility of the investigation's findings. The refusal of
the commission to investigate similar allegations against the Sandinistas painted a biased
149
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picture against Somoza, adding additional fuel to his double standard claims.150 It
presented a one-sided picture which highlighted every alleged flaw of the Somoza regime
while ignoring the actions of the Cuban-backed Communist Sandinistas.
Wilson also attacked the timing of the O.A.S. visit to Nicaragua and the countries
that organized the trip. He found the timing of the group’s arrival in early October
“convenient” because the National Guard was still conducting operations against the
Sandinistas. The violence of August and September had not been fully dealt with, and
operations were ongoing, providing vivid pictures to cast the regime in the worst possible
light. The fact that the actions of the Sandinistas were ignored in the final report further
illustrated his claims of bias. Wilson also took aim at the countries who had organized the
timing of the visit. Panama, Costa Rica, and Venezuela had all played active roles in
arranging the visit, and their animosity towards Somoza led Wilson to condemn the entire
affair as evidence of a conspiracy aimed at undermining the regime. The refusal of the
United States to support Somoza, a longstanding ally, in international bodies like the
OAS was why Wilson had chosen to challenge the administration’s policy towards
Nicaragua. The administration was allowing a friendly government to be thrown under
the bus while at the same time ignoring the actions of a Communist insurgency actively
trying to take over Nicaragua. Somoza was to be attacked because of his rights record
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while other regimes with similar or worse records continued to receive American support
and backing.151

January-April 1979: Attacking the Canal Once Again and Somoza on Face
the Nation
In January 1979 Wilson had been offered a place on the Military Affairs
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. According to Wilson, serving on
the subcommittee had been his goal since he first got on Appropriations. He had taken the
position on the Foreign Operation Subcommittee to wait for a position to become
available on Military Affairs. However, now that the position he had coveted had been
offered to him he turned it down. Wilson insisted that he made his decision not to fulfill
this personal ambition so that he could remain active on Nicaragua. His position on
Foreign Operations gave him the ability to influence foreign aid to the Somoza
government and allowed him to use threats to the foreign aid bill as leverage in this
struggle.152

More Threats and Murphy’s Meeting with Carter
He used this position to deliver a threat to the administration and the State
Department. If aid to Nicaragua was reduced any further, Wilson threatened to "single-
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handedly eliminate Latin America from the aid program this year."153 Attacks on aid to
Latin America could have potentially endangered the Panama Canal Treaty once again.
His fellow Somoza supporter, Rep. John Murphy, also attempted to use the Canal to force
Carter to change course on Nicaragua. While dining with the President, Murphy tried to
convince Carter to link the Canal Treaty legislation to Nicaragua. Carter refused to
consider this plan and made it clear to Murphy that he was serious about Nicaragua.
Murphy had attempted to use his position as Chairman of the House Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee, which was responsible for maritime trade legislation including
the Canal, to threaten the ratification process. However, his bargaining position was not
as strong as he implied because if he attempted to hold up the Treaty in his committee,
the legislation could be removed and given to other committees that also had a claim of
jurisdiction. Carter went on to make his case that Somoza had to change his policies and
that the current situation could not continue. Murphy promised to use his influence to
moderate Somoza's policies, but he came to realize that Carter was unlikely to budge on
Nicaragua.154
Carter’s refusal to budge during this meeting represented a watershed moment for
the Somoza Lobby. With the President directly involved in the policy-making process,
the divisions within the administration that had aided them for so long began to close.
Carter had made it clear that he would not, as Wilson desired, reverse course and support
Somoza as previous presidents had done in the past. The best Wilson and the Lobby
153
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could manage after this was a holding action, preventing the complete withdrawal of
American support, but unable to increase that support. Their best hope was that Somoza
could weather the storm and either outlast the Sandinistas or the Carter Administration. It
is possible that Carter's shift to a more hawkish anti-Communists stance in December
1979. following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, could have resulted in a softer policy
towards Somoza. However, the regime fell in July 1979 before geopolitical events forced
a foreign policy change.
Ironically, the pressure exerted by Wilson, Murphy, and the rest of the Somoza
Lobby to maintain American support to Nicaragua appeared to undermine their own
positions. Until 1978 the administration had been preoccupied with events in the Middle
East and relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Wilson complained that this
focus left policy towards Nicaragua in the hands of liberal appointees who lacked the
experience to understand the effect of their policy, especially in the face of a Communist
threat.155 Despite his complaints, his efforts were also aided by the back-burner status of
Nicaragua. The prior willingness of the State Department and the White House to bend
their policy and make various concessions to Somoza were partially rooted in the fact that
Nicaragua was not a top priority. Once Carter became directly involved in policy towards
Nicaragua, rather than leaving it to bureaucrats in the State Department, Wilson and his
allies had to confront Carter directly. Carter’s refusal to budge on his policy towards
Somoza revealed the limitations faced by members of Congress trying to influence
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foreign policy. After Nicaragua became a major issue for the Executive Branch and the
State Department, the conditions that had resulted in concessions no longer existed. This
limited the ability of Wilson and his allies to press for increased support to Nicaragua
during the final months of Somoza’s rule.
The effort to link the Panama Canal to Nicaragua ultimately failed to change
Carter's policy, but they did manage to gain some concessions for Somoza. In February,
the White House refused to withdraw the America ambassador from Nicaragua and cut
off diplomatic relations with the Somoza regime. Critics credit this decision to Carter
surrendering to pressure brought by Wilson and Murphy through their threats to wreck
the foreign aid bill. Supporters of Human Rights saw this decision as another victory for
the Somoza Lobby and blasted the administration for failing to break away from
Somoza.156 Had the American ambassador been withdrawn it would have created a clear
message that the relationship between the Somoza government and the U.S. was in
danger. Wilson and the Somoza Lobby were able to prevent a complete break between
the United States and Somoza, preserving the image of symbolic, if tarnished, support for
the regime. Through their efforts the Carter Administration was essentially trapped in
Nicaragua, because it did not want to risk damage to their wider agenda.
The administration's refusal to fully sever ties to Somoza can also be viewed as an
attempt to hedge its bets. Even in the spring of 1979, Somoza still appeared to hold a
strong position. The National Guard had grown in size to 11,000 men and remained loyal
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to the government. Nicaragua had been resupplied with military equipment from Israel
and Guatemala, and it remained unclear who would prevail in the end.157 By not
withdrawing all signs of support from Somoza, the State Department was leaving a path
back in if the regime managed to outlast the revolutionaries.
In April Somoza travelled to America during the Easter holiday. While in the
country he gave an interview on the C.B.S. program Face the Nation, where he sought to,
as usual, make his case to the American public. He condemned the White House and
State Department for failing to support Nicaragua after it had provided decades of loyal
support to the United States. He also addressed claims made by the American mediation
team which stated that there was no chance for peace in Nicaragua as long as Somoza
remained in power. Somoza countered this statement by claiming that the State
Department had simply wanted him to leave and had not had a true plan for mediation.
Furthermore, he made clear that he had offered to settle the conflict with the opposition
with a plebiscite. If he had won the vote, he would have remained in power and if he lost
then he would have left. Somoza also attempted to stoke fears of Communist expansion
by saying that the revolutionaries wanted to remake Nicaragua along the same lines as
Cuba.158
Somoza went on to blame the violence and unrest in Nicaragua on a conspiracy
against his government between Panama, Venezuela, and Costa Rica. He claimed that the
Sandinistas would disappear once support, particularly from Panama and Venezuela was
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halted. He also blamed aggressive actions taken by the United States for encouraging the
unrest and violence.159 Somoza’s comments blaming the Carter Administration, through
its lack of support for encouraging the revolution against his government, reflected his
sense of betrayal. After all, Nicaragua had been a loyal ally of the United States for
decades, and now when it was threatened by a Communist revolution the Carter
Administration refused to return that support.
Wilson shared the belief that America was betraying a loyal friend by not going to
Somoza’s aid. In a press conference on June 12, 1979, he claimed the lack of support had
led the White House and State Department to trade a “totalitarian, pro-American regime
in Somoza” for a “totalitarian, anti-American regime in the Sandinistas”. This statement
illustrated why Wilson had gotten involved in Nicaragua in the first place. It was not out
of any personal affection for Somoza, but instead out of a desire to preserve an embattled
American ally under threat from Communist aggression. At the same time, he
acknowledged that Somoza had clear flaws, but his value as an ally against Communism
meant that to Wilson these flaws should be overlooked. Other regimes with equal or
worse governments, but seen as strategically valuable or contained oil, were not subjected
to the same level of scrutiny as Somoza. In Wilson’s opinion Somoza and Nicaragua had
been betrayed after years of loyalty in part because it lacked any such asset. The lack of
strategic value had made Nicaragua expendable and led it to be surrendered to the
Communists. He repeatedly stressed the links between the revolution and Communist
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Cuba in another attempt to demonstrate that the choice in Nicaragua was between
Somoza and a Marxist government.160
Most surprisingly, Wilson declared that he had given up on pressuring the Carter
Administration to change its policy towards Somoza. He had fought for over two years to
keep support flowing to Nicaragua, but now it had become clear that the end of the
Somoza dynasty was fast approaching.161 It was also clear that Carter's policy would not
change and, given the situation on the ground, even if it had it would have made little
difference. Somoza was on the ropes and barring a direct military intervention, which
was not even considered, would fall. Now that it had become clear that Somoza was
finished, he resigned on July 17, 1979, Wilson shifted his attacks to a new target. For the
first time he came out in opposition to the Panama Canal Treaty. Despite his attempts to
threaten the Treaty as leverage for support to Somoza, he had personally and consistently
supported Carter’s plan to hand it over to Panama. However, he claimed that he could no
longer support the Treaty because of evidence that Panama was actively supporting the
Sandinistas against Somoza. This was based on reports that a Panamanian plane carrying
weapons bound for the revolutionaries was captured in Miami. This report was released
just three weeks before Wilson gave his press conference.162
On June 18th, in one of his final acts in support of Somoza, Wilson joined with
one hundred members of the House of Representatives and five Senators in sending a
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letter to Carter. In it they begged the President to come to the aid of Somoza in order to
prevent a second Cuba. However, the willingness of the U.S. to continue in its support of
Somoza, limited as it had become, evaporated on June 20, 1979. That day A.B.C. reporter
Bill Stewart, reporting from Nicaragua, was executed by a member of the Nicaraguan
National Guard. His crew filmed the event and the video was aired that evening on
American television. The video shocked and outraged the American public leading to
increased pressure on Somoza.163 Wilson attempted to spin the execution as the actions of
a single soldier acting without orders, because there were no officers present at the time.
He also continued to urge that the administration should not forget the decades of loyal
support provided by the Somoza regime.164 Despite his efforts the damage was done and
it became clear that the United States would not aid Somoza further. By June, the
renewed offensive launched by the Sandinistas in May, had driven Somoza into a
fortified bunker in the Nicaraguan capital of Managua. With most of the country in rebel
hands, Somoza was forced to resign on July 17, 1979 after bowing to pressure from the
U.S., bringing an end to Charlie Wilson’s first war.
The collapse of the Somoza regime ended the immediate viability of Nicaragua as
a battleground in this struggle. This led Wilson to look for a new target to carry on the
fight. Panama’s support for the Sandinistas made it an easy target of opportunity.
Wilson’s shift in his anti-Communist campaign towards Panama demonstrated that his
support for Somoza was motivated by a desire to confront Communism. Withdrawing his
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support for the Panama Canal Treaty was a way of punishing for all parties involved in
toppling Somoza. Wilson’s anti-Communist stance on foreign policy existed before
Nicaragua and his support for Somoza, it would remain a driving force behind his
hawkishness into the 1980s and lead to fame in the deserts of Afghanistan.

86

Conclusion
Wilson’s constant support of Somoza was based on his own anti-Communist
beliefs and his desire to challenge what he saw as a double standard in Carter’s human
rights policy. He believed that the administration’s preoccupation with the Middle East
and normalizing U.S.-Soviet relations had left foreign policy towards other regions,
including Latin America, neglected. Without the direct involvement of higher ranking
and knowledgeable officials, policy towards these neglected regions was left to political
appointees. In Wilson’s opinion these appointees were part of the “flaming radical left”,
who sought to use the human rights issue to single out right-wing dictatorships friendly to
the United States for abuses of human rights. At the same time they applied this policy in
a biased manner by ignoring the actions of left-wing dictatorships with similar records.165
It was out of a desire to confront this bias that Wilson began looking for a place to pick a
fight with this group of political appointees who had allegedly hijacked American foreign
policy. Nicaragua and Somoza simply became the place he chose to make his stand after
being recruited by Korth and the Somoza Lobby.166

165

“Transcript of Wilson press conference, June 12, 1979", C.W. Collection, Box 1 Folder 18, 1-4.
Choyke, “Nicaraguan military aid based on 'skimpy details',” Star-Telegram, (Fort Worth), July 29, 1977,
C.W. Collection, Box 1 Folder 34.
166

87

The presence of this lobby and the active recruitment of Wilson demonstrated that
Somoza was aware of the need to maintain American support for his regime. Throughout
his alliance with Wilson, Somoza always pursued his own agenda focused on remaining
in power. At the same time he took active steps, including granting interviews with the
American media, in an effort to maintain support for his government. During these
interviews Somoza crafted his arguments to stress the decades of support Nicaragua had
provided to the United States. He also portrayed Nicaraguan opposition groups as being
linked to Cuba and sharing a Communist ideology.167 Labeling opponents as Communists
was a direct attempt to play on the traditional Cold War view of American foreign policy,
which Wilson shared. This rhetoric had worked for the Somozas for over forty years, but
Carter’s election altered the equation. The recruitment of Wilson and the efforts of the
Somoza Lobby were directed at correcting this shift in American foreign policy.
Wilson believed that Somoza and Nicaragua had been singled out by the human
rights faction because it was a small nation without oil or strategic importance. This made
it the perfect place to test the human rights policy. He viewed the attacks directed at
Somoza by the State Department as a betrayal of a traditional Cold War ally in the battle
against Communism. This betrayal would encourage America’s Communist enemies to
expand further. At the same time it would demoralize other allies of the United States
who would fear their own loss of support. To Wilson this shift posed a danger to U.S.
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security and went against his own anti-Communist beliefs. America was abandoning its
friends and by doing so supporting its enemies.168
Wilson’s efforts on behalf of Somoza began in March of 1977 and would last
until Somoza fell from power in July of 1979. He used his position on the powerful
House Appropriations Committee to secure U.S. aid for Somoza. During 1977 he
accomplished this through the legislative process by rounding up votes to defeat
measures aimed at cutting off aid.169 However, by 1978 the increase in violence in
Nicaragua made this tactic more difficult. Instead Wilson and the Somoza Lobby turned
to threats to force the Administration to keep support flowing to the regime. They took
aim at the Panama Canal Treaty, Carter’s primary policy for Latin America, and
threatened its ratification if aid to Somoza was cut.170 Wilson used this position in
Congress to threaten Carter’s entire foreign aid bill in his effort to gain aid for Somoza.
Threats such as this worked because until August of 1978, Nicaragua was not a major
concern for the administration. This back burner status led it to compromise with Wilson
rather than risk damaging its entire foreign policy agenda.171
The outbreak of additional violence and growing instability in Nicaragua by
August brought Carter and the White House into control of U.S. policy towards the crisis.
It also led Wilson to shift his attacks from arguing over supposed biases on the human
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rights issue to the need to preserve Somoza in the face of a Communist threat from the
Sandinistas. For him the choice for the United States in Nicaragua was between Somoza,
a totalitarian American ally, or the Sandinistas, who would bring about a totalitarian antiAmerican regime. This Communist threat reinforced Wilson’s belief that the White
House and State Department were betraying Somoza and by doing so allowing a second
Cuba to form.172 Carter’s direct involvement brought the limitations of Congress’s ability
to alter foreign policy into focus. Once the President took an active role in the situation,
the willingness of the State Department to make deals with Wilson diminished. Carter’s
refusal to change his policy on Somoza in January 1979 signaled the beginning of the end
for Wilson’s efforts to force a change in policy.173 Without the support of the President or
the majority of Congress it was impossible for Wilson to alter America’s new stance
towards Somoza.
He continued to support Somoza until the end of the regime in July 1979. Wilson
blamed the Carter Administration and its lack of support for the collapse of the Somoza
dynasty. He also laid the blame for the Communist takeover of Nicaragua at the feet of
the State Department and White House, because even if the Carter Administration had
not actively aided the Sandinistas, the withdrawal of support had undermined the regime.
Americ's betrayal had allowed the opposition to topple Somoza and create a Marxist state
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in his place. This outraged the anti-Communist in Wilson and made his first war a
failure.174
The same anti-Communist beliefs that motivated Wilson to support Somoza
would lead him into the mountains of Afghanistan. The covert war he funded in those
mountains would eventually make him famous. However, his actions in both Afghanistan
and Nicaragua were fueled by Wilson’s Cold War anti-Communists view of foreign
policy. The same desire and mindset to confront Communist aggression that led him to
support Somoza would drive him to the aid of embattled Afghan "freedom fighters"
during the 1980s. The lessons Wilson learned in his failed adventures in Nicaragua, about
the power of a well-placed Congressman to influence foreign policy, would aid him in
securing victory in Afghanistan. The greatest of these lessons was the need for support
from the Executive Branch in order for a Congressman to succeed in shaping foreign
policy. Wilson lacked that support in Nicaragua and failed to save Somoza. He had the
support of the Reagan Administration for his covert war in Afghanistan and succeeded in
defeating the Soviet Union.
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